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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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AGAM-P (M) (22 Apr 68) FOR OT RD 681098

29 April 1968

AD 389941

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)**

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
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
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
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OPERATIONAL REPORT****ON LESSONS LEARNED****SECRET**

OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

QUARTELY PERIOD ENDING 31 JANUARY 1968

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM  
APO San Francisco 96350

AFVA-40-01

15 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 UIC NIDLLA HQ I FFORCEV (U)

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## SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

## 1. (S) General:

a. In November, December 1967 and January 1968, United States and Free World Military Forces (FWMF) with a maximum of 45 maneuver battalions, 27 US and 18 ROK, supported by 29 artillery battalions and Army Vietnam (ARVN) with 32 maneuver battalions supported by 6 artillery battalions continued operations in II Corps Tactical Zone (II CTZ) in the west along the Cambodian/Laotian/Republic of Vietnam (RVN) border in Darlac, Pleiku and Kontum Provinces; and along the east coast in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa and Binh Thuan Provinces. Along the Cambodian/Laotian/RVN border, combat operations were primarily oriented toward the destruction of enemy forces, interdiction of enemy infiltration routes and surveillance of the western border. On the east coast operations were oriented on search and destroy and cordon and search operations to destroy enemy forces and support revolutionary development.

b. Enemy losses for the period were 8,720 KIA (BC), 1,190 captured, 2,627 individual and 287 crew served weapons captured. Additionally, II CTZ accounted for 751 Hoi Chanh.

## 2. (C) Intelligence

a. General: During the past quarter there were no major changes in organization or staff activities of the JCS, G2. Increased cooperation between the intelligence staffs and agencies has reduced the number of problems to the point where monthly intelligence staff conferences are unnecessary and only quarterly conferences are warranted. The next quarterly conference will be hosted by II ARVN Corps.

## b. Significant Sources, Agencies and Techniques:

(1) There were no major changes in sources, agencies or techniques noted during the reporting period.

(2) The shortage of linguists continued to detract from the overall intelligence effort of this headquarters.

## (3) D Detachment, 1st MI Bn (LRS)

(a) The Detachment has continued its assigned mission of imagery interpretation, reproduction and delivery to field units of tactical imagery. As a result of 1,055 sorties flown, 281,894 feet of photography were processed, resulting in a total of 166,552 prints interpreted and 535 Imagery Interpretation reports prepared.

(b) Multi-sensor imagery missions (the simultaneous acquisition of color, camouflage detection and black and white photography with infrared imagery of a single target) have produced intelligence information that has justified the expense involved.

(c) Hand-held photography missions increased in importance as intelligence gathering means. Tactical Exploitation Teams

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performed hand-held camera missions in support of Company B, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (5th SFGA) and Kontum Province advisory personnel. A total of 87 hand-held camera missions were flown covering 387 targets and resulted in the production of 2972 prints. Types of missions included construction surveys, verification of aircraft crash location, determination of flood damage to bridges, post strike analysis of damage to friendly areas, bridge and route security planning, basic coverage of bridges and villages and confirmation of the location of isolated agricultural areas. The missions were flown primarily by the 183d Reconnaissance Airplane Company and were in addition to that unit's primary mission of locating enemy activity. On numerous routine reconnaissance flights, photographers were assigned to photograph targets of opportunity.

(4) G2 Air:

(a) Reallocation of I FFORCEV O-1 aircraft was accomplished on 13 January 1968. This reallocation placed all O-1 aircraft under the staff supervision of the I FFORCEV Aviation Officer. Approximately 55% of these aircraft were sub-allocated to G2 for the II Corps Visual Reconnaissance Program. This action left the control of the balance of O-1 aircraft with the Aviation Officer for employment in a combat support role.

(b) The following is a summary of relative surveillance tasks accomplished during the quarter:

	<u>MOHAWK</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>
Photo	32.7%	67.3%
Infrared	60.6%	39.4%
SLAR	100.0%	0.0%

(5) Collection (55th MID): During the quarter, 224 individual weapons, 31 crew-served weapons and 3000 pounds of uniforms, equipment and medical supplies were evacuated to MACV J2 for technical intelligence examination. IPW teams screened and classified 295 detainees and interrogated 206 Hqs. As a result of these interrogations 221 PIRs and IRs were prepared and distributed. Captured documents were screened and 59.2 feet of documents were forwarded to CDEC for further exploitation. IPW teams also translated 83 Korean language documents and reports.

(6) The 64th Engineer Detachment (TOPO) (CORES) processed and distributed 77,100 copies of Tactical Data Overprint maps and 27,000 copies of Terrain Analysis maps.

c. Deviation from Current Intelligence Doctrine: No change from previous quarter.

d. Significant Changes from Previous Reports: None.

e. Enemy Order of Battle:

(1) Disposition of NVA, VC Main Forces and VC Local Forces is shown at Inclosure 1.

(2) NVA and VC forces suffered heavy casualties during the reporting period, notably in the Western Highlands and Binh Dinh Province. Enemy activity was possibly the heaviest of the war in the Western Highlands during November. Activity throughout the CTZ increased as the Winter-Spring Campaign began and culminated in the coordinated attacks against major population centers on 30 and 31 January. The 47th NVA Artillery Regiment was accepted as a probable new unit in the Trz-

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Border area during the period. Current intelligence confirms that at least 1375 personnel infiltrated into II CTZ since 1 November 1967, although estimates of this infiltration run as high as 6000. Of the 1375 infiltrators who were confirmed, 700 went to the B3 Front, 600 went to the 2d VC Regiment and 75 went to the 95th Regiment.

## (3) Enemy losses During the Period:

### November 67.

FORCES	KIA	*DOW & DISABLED	PW	INOV WPMS	C/S WPMS
US	1837	643	124	365	93
MACAF	495	173	64	289	24
ARVN	732	256	101	249	0
TOTAL	3064	1072	289	903	117

### HOI CHANH 344

### December 67

US	1163	406	136	279	39
MACAF	475	166	119	175	16
ARVN	612	214	66	185	2
TOTAL	2250	786	321	639	57

### HOI CHANH 217

### January 68

US	1302	426	168	244	32
MACAF	196	279	66	373	52
ARVN	1308	458	326	468	29
TOTAL	3406	1163	560	1085	113

### HOI CHANH 190

## (4) Enemy strength within II CTZ as of 1 February 1968.

NVA Troops	- 17,267
VC Regulars	- 9,318
Admin Sec.	5,575
Military (VC irreg-guerrilla)	- 23,400
Political Cadre (infrastructure)	21,217
Total	- 76,777

\*Based on MACV estimate that for every 100 enemy killed by body count, an additional 35 die of wounds or are permanently disabled.

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### f. Enemy Capabilities and Vulnerabilities:

#### (1) Enemy Capabilities:

(a) In the Western Highlands, the B3 Front is capable of undertaking multi-regimental size coordinated attacks as indicated.

1. In Kontum Province, attack in multi-regimental strength against Ben Het Special Forces Camp, with secondary efforts in Dak To District and in multi-battalion strength in the Kontum City area.

2. In Pleiku Province, attack in multi-battalion strength supported by LF and LF units. Most likely targets are Duc Co, Plei Djerong and Pleiku City. Conduct ambushes in multi-company strength along QL 14 and QL 19.

3. Attack Ban Me Thuot in Darlac Province in multi-battalion strength supported by local forces.

(b) In the coastal lowland provinces of Binh Dinh, Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa attack in multi-battalion strength in conjunction with diversionary attacks by sapper, main force and local force units. Conduct raids against district headquarters and LF/FF units.

(c) In Binh Thuan and Lam Dong Provinces, attack in up to multi-battalion strength supported by district and guerrilla forces.

(d) Attack isolated outposts, installations and units with up to reinforced battalion strength in any province in conjunction with attempts to ambush relief forces.

(e) Continue harassment, sabotage, assassination and probing activities.

(f) Attack in multi-regimental strength employing any combination of the above capabilities, carried out separately or in coordination with each other.

#### (2) Enemy Vulnerabilities:

(a) Enemy LOC's are extended and insecure, with the exception of those traversing neutral countries or international waters, where some degree of security exists.

(b) The enemy is generally short of medicine and food.

(c) The enemy's limited capability to engage in conventional warfare for extended periods makes him vulnerable to superior allied firepower in any large-scale enemy offensive.

### g. Long Range Patrol (LRP) Company:

(1) Training: Continuing the training program cited in the report for the previous period, the 4th and 2d Patrol Platoons finished the MACV Recondo School in November and the 3d Patrol Platoon graduated on 15 December. Immediately after each platoon finished Recondo School training, they conducted a live patrol FTX in the MACARTHUR AO, with the Mission Support Station (MSS) established at Plei Do Lim CIDG Camp.

(2) Operations: By 22 November, eight days ahead of the programmed date of operational readiness, the 1st Patrol Platoon was deployed with the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, for 39 days of operations in the KHAMMATH FALLS AO. By 1 January all four platoons had

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participated in operational missions. The operational statistics for the months of December and January are as follows:

- (a) Number LRP personnel KIA/WIA: 2/3
- (b) Number enemy personnel KIA: 8 (30), 2 (Prob)
- (c) Number LRP insertions: 78
- (d) Number LRP sightings of VC/NVA: 31
- (e) Number emergency extractions: 14

### h. Weather:

(1) Interior: The northeast monsoon prevailed over the area throughout this period and there was very little day to day change in the weather pattern over the interior. Skies were generally fair to partly cloudy with ground fog forming in the high mountain valleys near sunrise. Fog was especially heavy during this period in the Dak To area and hampered some airlift operations during the early morning hours. Very little rain fell over the interior during this period; the only significant amount occurred with a dissipating tropical storm that moved across the central plateau on the 10th and 11th of November.

(2) Coast: The northeast monsoon has been very dry this year and precipitation was about half of the normal expected during this period. Skies were partly cloudy to cloudy during November and December but by mid-January skies became mostly fair. During November and December ceilings along the coast from Nha Trang northward were generally 1500 to 2500 feet during the early morning hours but lifted to 3000 to 4000 feet by noon. The coastal ridges in PESHING, Capital ROK Division and 9th ROK Division areas of operations were usually obscured with low clouds and light rain between the hours of 0200 hours to 1000 hours. Very little rain was reported along the coast south of Nha Trang. Typhoon Freda hit the coast between Tuy Hoa and Ninh Hoa on the morning of 10 November. Winds as high as 65 knots were reported within a 20 mile radius of the storm center. The storm weakened rapidly as it moved inland; however, it deposited 2-3 inches of rain along the coast between Ninh Hoa and Qui Nhon and heavier amounts in the mountains to the west of this area.

(3) Effects on Operations: The strong winds associated with Typhoon Freda damaged some buildings in the Ninh Hoa and Tuy Hoa area but did very little damage elsewhere. Monsoon rains washed out several bridges on the Highway north of Qui Nhon and at Nha Trang. Phases II and III of Operation ~~SEARCH~~ were both delayed because of weather. Spooky could not support ~~the attack~~ on Lac Thien when it was under attack on 24 January due to heavy ground fog. There were a total of 29 TAC Sorties and 87 trail dust missions cancelled due to weather. No other effects on operations are known.

(4) Detachment 31, 5th Weather Squadron has the mission of supporting I Field Force Vietnam and USAF tactical units in II CTZ, plus the Americal Division and the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in I CTZ. This support is being provided in the following manner:

### (a) I.FFORCEV

- 1. Staff Weather Officer (SWO)
- 2. Forecast Support Center for II CTZ
- 3. Climatological Support

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31-January 1968 RCS CS-JR-65 UIC WDDLHQ HQ IFFORCEV (U)

(b) 4th Infantry Division

1. SWO and forecast support at base camp
2. Observations at base camp
3. Observations at Brigade Tactical CP's
4. Climatological Support

(c) Dalat/Cam Ly Airfield

1. Observations
2. Forecasts on an as requested basis

(d) An Xhe

1. Observations
2. Forecasts on an as requested basis

(e) Americal Division

1. Forecast support at Chu Lai
2. Observations at Brigade Tactical CP's
3. Climatological Support

(f) 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

1. SWO and forecast support at base camp
2. SWO and forecast support at Division Forward

when operational

3. Observations at Brigade Tactical CP's and  
Division Forward CP when operational

4. Climatological Support

3. (S) Operations and Training Activities.

a. (S) Plans: Based on guidance, intelligence, and the overall strategy, the G3 Plans Division formulated and published four OPLANS and six FRAG ORDERS during the reporting period. In addition, the Combined Campaign Annual Summary for 1967, the Northern Assessment for November, and the Annual Assessment for 1967 were published and submitted to MACV.

(1) OPLANS and FRAG ORDERS:

(a) OPLAN 137-67 (PATRICK) is a contingency plan designed to maintain sufficient force in Northern Binh Dinh Province to prevent resurgence of enemy activity and to provide security for the revolutionary development effort. The plan provides for the relief of the 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AK) by the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div for coordination with elements of the 22d ARVN Div, the Vietnamese Marine Task Force and the CAP ROK Infantry Division in the PATRICK Area of Operations. This plan was published 20 November 1967 and is to be executed on order.

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(b) OPLAN 215-67 (KLAMATH FALLS) was published on 27 November 1967. It provided for the location and destruction of HQ MH6 and opening of QL-1 from Phan Rang to II/III CTZ Boundary. The operation involved elements of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, TF 2d Bde, 7th Cav, 23d ARVN Div and Co B, 5th SFGA. The operation began 1 December 1967 and terminated 7 January 1968.

(c) OPLAN 101-68 (DECATUR) was updated and republished on 20 January 1968 and is a contingency plan which deploys II CTZ forces to relieve camps, headquarters, outposts and critical signal sites within the Corps Zone. It provides for the employment of forces varying in size from a rifle company to a division (-) and is to be executed on order.

(d) OPLAN 200-68 (MCLAIN) is an open end operation which began 20 January 1968. It is a search and destroy operation intended to counter enemy threats, exploit hard intelligence and assist Allied Forces in highway security and revolutionary development efforts. It employs the 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf, releasing TF 2d Bn, 7th Cav to its parent unit. Effective with the relief, the name of the AO was changed from BYRD to MCLAIN.

(e) FRAG ORDER 69-67 (BAUSH) employed a Mobile Strike Force of Co B, 5th SFGA in a stay behind role following the extraction of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div from Binh Thuan and Lan Dong Provinces. The operation commenced 7 December 1967 and terminated 19 January 1968.

(f) FRAG ORDER 71-67 (SULTAN) was a 30 day operation employing forces of Project DELTA in a reconnaissance role. The operation commenced 1 December 1967 and was suspended on 23 December 1967. After a stand-down the operation commenced again on 6 January 1968 and terminated on 25 January 1968.

(g) FRAG ORDER 74-67 (HALL) was a Mobile Strike Force operation which commenced 17 December 1967 north of Phan Rang in Binh Thuan Province. The purpose of this operation was to interdict infiltration routes, to destroy enemy installations and forces and to develop targets for air attack, artillery and conventional forces. Forces utilized in this operation were from Co B, 5th SFGA. The operation terminated on 5 January 1968.

(h) FRAG ORDER 77-67 (SILVESTER) employed a Camp Strike Force of Co B, 5th SFGA in a guerrilla role in Southern Binh Dinh Province. The force was to destroy enemy installations and forces and to develop targets to be attacked by air, artillery and conventional forces. The operation commenced 19 December 1967 and terminated on 2 January 1968.

(i) FRAG ORDER 1-68 (CSF OPERATIONS) was initiated to support Operation SAN ANGELO by placing USSF personnel stationed at Bu Prang under the operational control of II FFORCEV for approximately 45 days. This OPCODE became effective 19 January 1968.

(j) FRAG ORDER 2-68 (BAHVN) commenced on 23 January 1968 and terminated 28 January 1968. The operation took place in Southern Binh Dinh Province to destroy enemy forces and installation and to develop targets. The operation was conducted by Co B, 5th SFGA.

### h. (C) Operational Activities.

#### (1) Operation BHD

(a) Operation BHD, which began on 25 August 1966, continued until 1 December 1967 in Binh Thuan Province with TF 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry conducting search and destroy operations in support of revolutionary development under OPCODE, HQ I FFORCEV. On 1 December

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the operation was temporarily suspended to allow TF 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry to join in Operation KIMATH FALLS with 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. The 3d and 4th Battalions, 44th Regiment (ARVN) continued to operate in the BIRD AO (Incl 2) throughout the period.

(b) In November, there were two moderate contacts in the AO. At 0245 hours, 8 November, 3d Battalion, 44th Regiment (ARVN) (-) vicinity Ft Mara (EN0373) was attacked by an estimated enemy battalion. At 0800 hours, Company C, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry air assaulted to the contact area at gunships and artillery supported. Although the enemy had succeeded in overrunning part of the position, the combined ARVN and US force was able to drive them off. The enemy was forced to break contact at 0900 hours, withdrawing to the north and northwest pursued by cavalry elements. ARVN losses were 28 killed or wounded in this action while US losses were six wounded. The enemy lost 42 killed and five PW's. On 22 November, Company D, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry sighted and engaged a VC company north of Phan Thiet, vicinity AN8127. A reaction force of two US companies and elements of the 4th Battalion, 44th Regiment (ARVN) were employed on the morning of 23 November and swept the area of the initial engagement. Contact was made with scattered groups of VC but by nightfall all contact had broken. The results of this action were 11 US killed, 36 wounded; enemy losses were 21 killed.

(c) As previously stated, the operation was suspended on 1 December. Operation BIRD was reinitiated on 8 January upon termination of Operation KIMATH FALLS on 7 January. TF 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry made only minor contacts until the operation terminated on 20 January and the Task Force was redeployed to AO PHU SHING to rejoin its parent organization. Results of Operation BIRD for the quarter: Friendly - 11 KIA, 57 WIA; Enemy - 96 KIA, 8 PW's, 43 small arms and 1 crew-served weapon captured. Cumulative results for the operation (25 August 1966 to 20 January 1968): Friendly - 34 KIA, 335 WIA; Enemy - 849 KIA, 1163 PW's, 297 small arms and 11 crew-served weapons captured.

(2) Operation MCLAIN.

(a) Operation MCLAIN commenced on 20 January 1968 as a continuation of Operation BIRD. The operation employed the 3d Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry in the AO previously named BIRD (Incl 3). Search and destroy operations and operations in support of Revolutionary Development in Binh Thuan Province were the principle missions assigned to the operation.

(b) On 23 January the Heip Hoa hamlet PF platoon made contact with an estimated enemy platoon vicinity EN245413. During the brief contact two PF were wounded and one carbine was lost. Additionally one civilian was killed in the action. Enemy losses in the contact were one VC killed and three small arms captured. A contact vicinity AN807087 between an estimated VC company and a PF platoon securing a bridge at that location resulted in two PF killed, nine PF wounded and one command car destroyed. A major contact occurred on 24 January when Go Boi hamlet was attacked by an estimated two VC companies. Results of the enemy attack were 20 PF, two RD and one civilian killed. Additionally 18 PF and four RD were wounded.

(c) The city of Phan Thiet, the province capital, came under enemy attack at 0315 hours 30 January by an unknown size enemy force using small arms and automatic weapons. It was estimated that the major portions of two enemy battalions were involved in the attack which penetrated the city and struck the MACV compound. The 3d Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry supported the action with gunships and flareships. The results of the action were six friendly killed (ARVN) and 33 wounded (two US). Enemy losses were 35 killed by US and 80 killed by ARVN forces, 20 PW's (three captured by US), 39 small arms (17 by US) and four crew-served weapons (two by US) captured.

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31 January 1968 HCS C-FOA-65 UIC-WDDLLA HQ IFFORCEV (U)

(d) Results for the period 20-31 January and cumulative results for the operation: Friendly: 12 KIA; Enemy: 46 KIA, three PW's, 17 small arms and two crew-served weapons captured.

(3) Operation PERSHING:

(a) Operation PERSHING, which began on 12 February 1967, continued during the quarter, with the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (-) operating in Binh Dinh and southern Quang Ngai Provinces. The 3d Brigade with three battalions was deployed to I CTZ under OPCON of the Americal Division on 2 October. The brigade was lost to the division for the remainder of the quarter. The 40th and 41st Regiments, 22d Division (RVN) and a two battalion Marine Task Force (RVN) continued operations in the PERSHING AO (Incl 4).

(b) On 13 November, the 1st Brigade with two battalions was deployed to Operation MACANUAR in the Dak To area. Throughout the remainder of the month the division continued operations in the PERSHING AO with three battalions and the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry. By necessity operations were conducted on a small scale, the emphasis being placed on the use of air scouts to cover large portions of the AO left uncovered by the departure of the two brigades (the 3d Brigade continuing OPCON to the Americal Division). Cordon and search operations conducted by the division with National Police forces were continued and met with significant success.

(c) The month of December witnessed an upsurge of both friendly and enemy initiated contacts. On 6 December contact was made by 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry with a large enemy force on the Bong Son Plain vicinity BS8907. By darkness on 6 December four companies had been inserted into the area and heavy contact had been made. From 6-12 December contact continued in this area as the cavalry and elements of the 1st, 2d and 3d Battalions of the 40th Regiment (RVN) combined forces to inflict heavy losses on the enemy. It has been determined that enemy forces engaged in these contacts were elements of the 22d NVA Regiment, to include companies of the 7th and 8th Battalions, the 132d Signal Company and the Regimental Headquarters.

(d) On 12 December the last elements of the 1st Brigade rejoined the division from Operation MA/AMKUK. On 15 December three companies of the brigade were tasked to cordon a village on the Bong Son Plain vicinity BS924056. As the units were moving toward the village they became engaged with an enemy force firing from the village of Binh Phu vicinity (BS915055). Although the three cavalry troops were unable to overrun the village on 15 December, their coordinated attack on the following day after intensive preparation by air and artillery met with little resistance. As a result of the contacts in this general area from 6-16 December, the enemy lost 414 killed while cavalry losses were 55 killed and 209 wounded.

(e) The cavalry again made contact with elements of the 22d NVA Regiment on 19 December north of the Cay Giap Mountains vicinity BS9501. The enemy was engaged by elements of 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry on 19-20 December resulting in 23 enemy killed without friendly loss. On 22 December, Troop C, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry responded to a report of a large size enemy force in the vicinity of the south Mui Mieu Mountains (ER9/68). Tactical air strikes, gunships, artillery and naval gunfire were brought to bear on the enemy resulting in 39 killed. There were no friendly casualties.

(f) On 29 December, CIDG elements of the Vinh Than Camp made contact with an estimated enemy battalion south of the camp vicinity ER6256. Assistance was rendered as elements of 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry and 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry reinforced. US artillery

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was fired in support of the contact which commenced at 0950 hours and was broken by the enemy at 1815 hours. The results of this action were 17 enemy killed by CIDG and 31 killed by cavalry elements.

(g) On 1 January elements of the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry (Mech) engaged a battalion size enemy force vicinity CROO0830. The enemy force was entrenched in bunkers and strong defensive positions. Co B, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry reinforced the battalion in a two-day offensive operation which included the employment of air strikes, airborne rocket artillery, artillery and air-delivered CS gas against strong enemy defenses. Results of the two day action were 11 friendly wounded while the enemy lost 76 killed, two PW's, 21 small arms and six crew-served weapons captured. On 3 January elements of the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry (Mech) conducting a sweep of the contact site located an additional 18 NVA bodies resulting from the contacts of 1-2 January.

(h) On 14 January the 2d and 3d Battalions, 40th Regiment (ARVN) supported by cavalry elements, made contact with an unknown size enemy force vicinity BS900080. The contact broke after three hours with the results of 11 ARVN killed and 18 wounded compared to enemy losses of 56 killed and 17 small arms captured.

(i) On 16 January the 1st Cavalry Division (AM)(-) commenced preparations for its move to 1 CIZ for operations with III Marine Amphibious Force. Advance parties departed on 16 January with the Division Headquarters and 1st Brigade moving from 17-23 January. The 2d Brigade, consisting of four battalions (2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry; 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry; 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry; and 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry), remained in the PAKSHING AO under the operational control of IFFORCEV. The DAZALAH Task, heretofore a part of the division responsibility, was assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade effective 2400 hours 17 January relieving the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) of this responsibility.

(j) On 21 January Company B, 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry was placed in support of the Capitol MOK Infantry Division for operations against the 18th NVA Regiment located vicinity BR 930530. The company remained in support of the MOK forces until 27 January when it returned to parent unit control.

(k) A major contact was made on 23 January vicinity BR960660 when elements of the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry engaged an estimated three VC companies of the 95th Battalion, 2d VC Regiment. The 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry reinforced the action which was supported by artillery, airborne rocket artillery and gunships. The battle broke after seven hours. The results of the contact were 128 enemy killed, one PW, 15 small arms and one crew-served weapon captured.

(l) The results of Operation PAKSHING for the quarter were friendly: 111 killed, 588 wounded; Enemy: 1721 killed, 255 PW's, 296 small arms and 45 crew-served weapons captured. Cumulative results for the operation through 31 January are as follows: Friendly: 610 killed, 2964 wounded; Enemy: 5639 killed, 2366 PW's, 1362 small arms and 139 crew-served weapons captured.

(4) Operation BOLLING:

(a) The 173d Airborne Brigade began Operation BOLLING on 19 September 1967 employing its 1st and 4th Battalions, 503d Infantry (Airborne) and the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry. The operation was designed to destroy enemy forces located in the high ground west of Tuy Hoa basin and was oriented on the 95th NVA Regiment (Incl 5).

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(b) On 1 November, 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) began moving to Dak To from the DOLLING AO where it became OFCON to 4th Infantry Division conducting Operation MACARTHUR. By 7 November the brigade headquarters and the 1st and 2d Battalions, 503d Infantry (Airborne) also had been moved to Dak To. The fourth battalion of the brigade, the 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) which had arrived in country on 23 October, moved into the DOLLING AO on 5 November and made its first contact with the enemy the following day. In this encounter the unit took no casualties while killing three VC and capturing their weapons. Contact continued to be light during the remainder of the month as it became obvious from the recently deserted positions that the enemy was avoiding contact.

(c) The brigade headquarters and the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) were redeployed from Operation MACARTHUR on 16 December closing into the DOLLING AO that same day. Contact continued light and sporadic throughout the area until 27 December when the 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) conducted a series of combat assaults into the Ky Lo Valley (DQ9580). Upon landing, elements of the battalion were taken under intense fire. The two assaulting companies were reinforced by two additional companies and contact continued throughout the day with an estimated two companies of enemy. On 28 December, both the 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) and the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) had elements in the contact areas as the brigade attempted to regain contact with the enemy. The search continued until 29 December, yielding small groups of enemy but no significant forces. The results of the actions over the three-day period were 62 enemy killed at a cost of 12 US killed and 34 wounded.

(d) During January, elements of the brigade continued to make sporadic contact with the enemy and to uncover numerous base camps. On 16 January a one battalion task force, 3d Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) deployed to the area to assume responsibility for the DAZZLE TAC. Responsibility was passed from the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) to the 173d Airborne Brigade effective 19 January.

(e) Results for Operation DOLLING for the quarter were as follows: Friendly: 32 KIA, 131 WIA, 3 MIA; Enemy: 237 KIA, 30 PWs, and 60 small arms captured.

#### (5) Operation MACARTHUR.

(a) This operation started on 12 October as a continuation of the 4th Infantry Division's border protection mission in the Western Highlands. The AO included Kontum, Pleiku and portions of Darlac and Binh Dinh Provinces (Incl. 6). On 1 November, the units in MACARTHUR were positioned as follows. The 1st Brigade, consisting of two battalions, operated in Kontum Province vicinity Dak To. Two battalions of the 2d Brigade plus two companies of the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry were deployed north of Ban Ma Thuot. Task Force 22, consisting of the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry (-) and the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech), operated in the Duc Co, Plai Djereng area.

(b) On 3 November elements of 2d Brigade made several scattered contacts with small groups of enemy resulting in 25 NVA killed. On 10 November the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry was moved to Dak To in response to an enemy build-up in that area and the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry became OFCON 2d Brigade. On 20 November the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry moved to Dak To and the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry from the 9th Infantry Division, became OFCON to the brigade. Action remained light in the 2d Brigade area throughout the remainder of the month.

(c) TF 22 continued to operate west of Pleiku and to secure Highways 14 and 19. A number of mining and sapper incidents occurred along these roads during the month which resulted in limited damage to US vehicles. The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry terminated

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operations west of Pleiku and the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry assumed the mission of TF 22. The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry moved south vicinity Buon Blach becoming OPCON to the 2d Brigade.

(d) The 1st Brigade initially commenced operations with two battalions in the vicinity of Dak To in response to an enemy build up. By 6 November, the 173d Airborne Brigade had deployed to the area with three battalions. On 3 - 4 November, the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made the first major contact with NVA forces on a prominent E-W ridgeline southwest of Dak To. On 5 November Mobile Strike Force (MSF) Companies 23 and 26 were inserted north and south of Ben Het. On the same day the 9th ARVN Airborne Battalion arrived at Tanh Canh. On 6 November the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) became heavily engaged with an NVA battalion southwest of Dak To vicinity of the ridgeline at YB8621. Heavy contact continued in this area until 11 November as the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne), 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry and the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry engaged elements of the 32d and 66th NVA Regiments. On 9 November the 9th ARVN Airborne Battalion and the 3d Battalion, 42d ARVN Regiment commenced operations north of Dak To against the 24th NVA Regiment. On 11 November the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry closed Dak To. The 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force and the 3d ARVN Airborne Battalion closed Tanh Canh on 13 November and started operating north of Dak To. The 1st Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airborne) closed Poiel Kleng on 19 November with the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry and moved south of Dak To on 19 November. From 13 - 19 November, the 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) and the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) was heavily engaged southwest of Dak To. The ARVN airborne units made contact with elements of the 24th NVA Regiment north of Tanh Canh from 17 - 19 November. An estimated reinforced NVA battalion was contacted by the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) on 19 November at a location eight kilometers west of the Cambodian border on Hill 875. Heavy casualties resulted from this action as the brigade reinforced with the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne). In this action 72 US were killed while 275 NVA bodies were counted. On 19 November the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was moved to Dak To and the 7th ARVN Airborne Battalion relieved the 9th ARVN Airborne Battalion north of Tanh Canh. On 24 November, the 1st Brigade of the Cavalry and the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry returned to Operation PERSHING. On 29 November, in response to timely intelligence, the 2d and 3d ARVN Airborne Battalions attacked the CP area of the 24th NVA Regiment making contact with an estimated two enemy battalions. Results of the contact were 10 ARVN killed and 109 NVA killed.

(e) During December, contact was light throughout the entire AO. As the enemy threat subsided in the Dak To area, 4th Infantry Division elements were repositioned. On 10 December, the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry was returned to the PERSHING AO and on 11 December, the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry rejoined its parent organization. The headquarters of the 173d Airborne Brigade and the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) returned to Operation HOLLING leaving TF 173 with two battalions, 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) and 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne), under the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division. On 27 December this task force was redesignated TF POWER HOUSE and with two troops, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, commenced operations southwest of Kontum City.

(f) During January, the enemy stepped up his activity in the MACARTHUR AO combining standoff rocket/mortar attacks with ground assaults in attempts to destroy US equipment and supplies and to harass friendly operations. Fire support bases at Dak To and Ben Het as well as the bases of the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received intensive mortar attacks during the month.

(g) On 1 January, a Camp Strike Force Company from Plei Hrong camp was attacked vicinity ZAL04538 by an estimated enemy battalion using small arms, automatic weapons and mortars. Friendly losses were three killed and four wounded at a cost to the enemy of 47 dead.

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(h) Kontum Airfield was attacked by a sapper team on 10 January. The 173d Airborne Brigade assisted the 57th Assault Helicopter Company in repelling the attack. The sappers destroyed four UH-1H and damaged nine. Friendly forces lost seven killed and 24 wounded while killing 14 enemy and capturing three small arms.

(i) At 0740 hours 15 January an estimated three NVA companies launched a heavy ground attack against a convoy vicinity ZB150130. By 0800 hours Troop B, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry had reinforced and was in heavy contact. At 1120 hours, Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry was inserted into the area. The enemy broke contact at 1300 hours having suffered 21 killed and losing five men as prisoners. Friendly casualties were three killed, 15 wounded, one tank and one OH-6A aircraft destroyed.

(j) From 0400-0130 hours 20 January, Pleiku received 31 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. The new Pleiku airfield, 71st Evacuation Hospital and positions of the 52d Artillery were struck. Major damage was inflicted on the hospital where one man was killed and 12 wounded.

(k) At 0247 hours 25 January, Camp Holloway (BY910120) came under ground attack supported by B40 rocket and mortar fire. At least 20 attackers broke through the perimeter and struck the ammunition supply point. The enemy force was identified as elements of the 407th Sapper Battalion. The enemy damaged 29 aircraft in his attack and wounded 18 US personnel.

(l) From 26 to 28 January in the vicinity of YB8830, the 6th ARVN Airborne Battalion engaged an unknown number of enemy in sporadic contacts which ranged from light to heavy throughout the period. The 4th Infantry Division supported the contact with artillery and aviation assets. The results of these contacts were 55 enemy killed while ARVN losses were 19 killed and 95 wounded.

(m) On 26 and 28 January the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with elements of an enemy battalion vicinity YB8829. The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons and 82mm mortars. The results of these actions were 4 US killed and 18 wounded. Enemy losses were 18 killed.

(n) During the early morning hours of 30 January elements of the 407th and 408th Sapper Battalions plus the H-15 Local Force Battalion launched an attack on Pleiku and penetrated the city in several locations. Elements of the 4th Infantry Division supported ARVN Ranger units and cavalry elements through 31 January. Results of the two days fighting were as follows: Friendly: 22 KIA, 93 WIA; Enemy: 123 KIA, 45 PW's and 66 small arms captured.

(o) At 0015 hours 30 January Kontum came under mortar attack with the primary target being the MACV Sector Compound. As the mortaring diminished, enemy elements commenced ground attacks on various installations within the city. An estimated 400 mortar and rocket rounds were fired into the city during the last two days of the month. Enemy units identified in the fighting included the K-2 Battalion, 174th Regiment, the 304th Local Force Battalion and the 407th Sapper Battalion.

(p) Results for the quarter in Operation MACARTHUR were: Friendly: 368 KIA, 1527 WIA, 21 MIA; Enemy: 1810 KIA, 73 PW's, 339 small arms and 110 crew-served weapons captured. Cumulative results for the operation through 31 January were: Friendly: 369 KIA, 1548 WIA, 21 MIA; Enemy: 1818 KIA, 76 PW's, 377 small arms and 111 crew-served weapons captured.

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### (6) Operation KLMATH FALLS:

(a) This operation commenced 1 December as a search and destroy operation in Binh Thuan and Lam Dong Provinces. The operation was directed against Headquarters, Military Region VI and main/local force units within the two provinces. Friendly forces, including the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and TF 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, were also tasked to open QL 1 from the II Corps-III Corps boundary to the Binh Thuan-Ninh Thuan Province boundary.

(b) Contact during December was light, but judging from the numerous large base camps and rice caches discovered, it was obvious that US forces had entered a well-prepared base area. During the period 18-21 December, the 5th Area Logistical Command (ARVN) conducted a 131 vehicle convoy from Nha Trang to Phan Thiet and back. This was the first successful ARVN convoy to move along this route since 1961. Elements of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry provided security along QL 1 for the convoy.

(c) During January contact was light in the AO as the enemy avoided decisive engagement with US forces. The operation was terminated on 20 January.

(d) Results of the operation were as follows:  
Friendly: 28 KIA, 138 WIA; Enemy: 156 KIA, 11 PW's, 74 small arms and three crew-served weapons captured.

### (7) Operation ROSE:

(a) When the 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry (Airborne) arrived in RVN, it embarked on Operation ROSE, a search and destroy operation in southern Ninh Thuan Province. Operation ROSE was designed as a shakedown operation for the battalion as well as an incursion into VC Base Area 35. The operation commenced on 11 November and terminated on 1 December to enable the battalion to join its parent unit, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in Operation KLMATH FALLS.

(b) Action was light during the entire operation. Scattered contacts were made with small groups of VC, usually at long range. Results for the period and the operation were: Friendly: four wounded; Enemy: eight killed and eight individual weapons captured.

(8) Special Operations: The following USSF-led operations were conducted in the II Corps Tactical Zone during the quarter at the direction of HQ IFFORCEV:

(a) Operation BOUNDNOT: This operation began on 15 October to detect enemy infiltration routes and way stations in northwestern Darlac Province. The 27th MSF Company originally was employed in Operation BOUNDNOT and was replaced on 16 November by Camp Strike Force (CSF) elements from Trang Phuoc CIDG Camp. Several small contacts were made during the period and recently occupied camp sites were discovered. The operation was terminated on 31 December.

(b) Operation PIERRE: This operation was conducted by CSF units of the Plei Djereung CIDG camp in the lower Plei Trap Valley from 9-13 December. The mission was to screen possible enemy routes of infiltration and to interdict routes of communication in the area. No contacts were made.

(c) Operation SULTAN: On 1 December Project DELTA forces entered the SULTAN AO in Kontum Province along the border employing reconnaissance and roadrunner teams to detect enemy movement to the east. The 91st Ranger Battalion (Sung) provided backup for the

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teams. There was light contact in the area during the month although valuable data concerning the presence of enemy units was developed. The operation was suspended on 23 December by JGS direction; it recommenced on 5 January. During January an increased number of enemy sightings were made which led to several light contacts in the AO. The operation was terminated on 25 January and the area became the responsibility of the 4th Infantry Division. Results of the operation were: Friendly: 14 KIA, 48 WIA; Enemy: 28 KIA, one PW and three small arms captured.

(d) Operation HELL: This mobile Strike Force (MSF) operation commenced 18 December west southwest of Con Canh Bay and terminated 5 January. There was light contact in the AO but some information of intelligence value was gained.

(e) Operation SYLVESTER: This CSF operation started on 19 December southwest of Qui Nhon and terminated on 31 December. The operation was directed at enemy forces in the vicinity of the Qui Nhon Support Command Ammunition Supply Point. Troops for the operation were provided from the Van Canh CIDG Camp. There was no contact in the AO during the operation.

(f) Operation BRUSH: MSF 25 commenced a stay-behind operation on 14 December in the KLANATH FALLS AO. The unit operated along the II Corps-III Corps boundary in the suspected location of HQ, Military Region VI. There were several light contacts with small groups of VC in the area and recently occupied, well constructed camp sites were discovered. The operation terminated on 20 January.

## c. G3 Air Operations:

(1) The number of sorties flown daily varied from 17 to 155 with a mean of 106.6 per day for the period 1 November 1967 through 31 January 1968. The most frequent missions were:

- (a) Direct support of friendly forces in contact.
- (b) Preparation fires on landing zones and objective areas.
- (c) Harassment and interdiction of enemy base areas, assembly areas and infiltration routes.
- (d) Night illumination and strikes.
- (e) Landing zone construction.

(2) During the period, approximately 15.3% of the missions flown for IFFORGEV were Combat Skyspot. One and six tenths percent of the sorties flown were in support of immediate missions.

(3) There were 9813 Tactical Sorties flown in support of major operations during the reporting period as indicated below:

OPERATION	TOTAL SORTIES	SORTIES DAY	REMARKS
BOLLING	467	5.2	10 secondary explosions, 34 military structures destroyed, 35 bunkers destroyed, 26 secondary fires, 2 KEA confirmed, 15 military structures damaged, 20 bunkers destroyed and numerous trenches destroyed, 65 KEA estimated, 3 trenches destroyed, 2 caves destroyed.

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<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>TOTAL SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES DAY</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
BYRD	308	3.3	4 secondary explosions, 9 secondary fires, 15 bunkers destroyed and numerous tunnels and caves destroyed, 10 confirmed VC/NVA KBA.
CAP ROK	1440	15.6	25 confirmed KBA, 370 military structures destroyed, 236 military structures damaged, 32 secondary explosions, 58 secondary fires, 32 caves destroyed, 2 bridges destroyed, 3 trenches destroyed, 3 bridges damaged, 15 bunkers destroyed and tunnels damaged, 3 KBA estimated, 1 WB, 2 AW positions destroyed.
DANIEL BOONE	54	.5	25 KBA confirmed, 8 KBA estimated, 2 military structures destroyed.
DAZZLEM	181	1.9	56 military structures destroyed, 9 military structures damaged, 26 bunkers damaged, 1 mortar position destroyed, 1 enemy CP destroyed, 26 bunkers destroyed.
KLAMATH FALLS	485	5.2	51 bunkers destroyed, 15 secondary explosions, 12 gun positions destroyed, 1 military structure damaged, 22 KBA confirmed, 1 sampan destroyed, 4 bunkers damaged, 1 mil. structure destroyed.
MACARTHUR	4362	47.4	45 KBA confirmed, 14 structures destroyed, 1 military structure damaged, 127 bunkers damaged, 122 bunkers destroyed, 135 secondary explosions, 45 secondary fires, 692 estimated KBA, 16 mortar positions destroyed, 4 trenches destroyed, 1 bridge destroyed, 4 AW positions destroyed, 1 tunnel destroyed, 3 caves damaged.
MCLAIN	14	.1	No EDA
PERSHING	1108	12.0	51 confirmed KBA, 44 military structures destroyed, 86 military structures damaged, 436 bunkers destroyed, 121 bunkers damaged, 54 secondary explosions, 2 AW positions destroyed, 6 caves destroyed, 4 bridges destroyed, 20 tunnels destroyed, 1 rice cache destroyed, 10 KBA estimated.
PIEURN	2	0	No EDA.
PROJECT ECHO	51	.5	No EDA.
9TH ROK	992	10.7	3 confirmed KBA, 5 KBA estimated, 6 secondary explosions, 7 secondary fires, 34 military structures destroyed, 26 military structures damaged, 25 caves destroyed, 1 bridge destroyed, 4 caves damaged.

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OPERATION	TOTAL SORTIES	SORTIES DAY	REMARKS
ROSE	35	.4	No EDA.
SULTAN	212	2.3	12 secondary explosions, 2 secondary fires, 4 EDA confirmed, 1 WBA, 4 AW destroyed, 7 AW damaged.
CRID	49	.7	No EDA.

(A) B-52 Support: There were 451 B-52 sorties flown during the quarter, compared to 169 sorties last quarter, in support of ground operations and on suspected enemy concentrations as indicated below:

DATE	NAME	CODE NAME	SORTIES	OPERATION
032045Z Nov	Binh Tuy 30	N-99	12	ECHO
040410Z "	HA 11-1	P-16	6	MACARTHUR
042040Z "	HA 11-2	P-1	9	"
080030Z "	HA 11-3	P-82	6	"
082000Z "	HA 11-4	P-68	5	"
091610Z "	HA 11-5	P-75	6	"
091900Z "	HA 11-6	P-40	3	"
101620Z "	HA 11-7	P-77	9	"
101820Z "	HA 11-9	P-97	6	"
112000Z "	HA 11-10	Q-44	3	"
112200Z "	HA 11-11	Q-17	6	"
131940Z "	HA 11-14	Q-65	9	"
141450Z "	HA 11-12	Q-04	9	"
141620Z "	HA 11-13	Q-73	9	"
150225Z "	HA 11-16	Q-87	9	"
151325Z "	HA 11-15	Q-76	6	"
161835Z "	HA 11-17	Q-3	9	"
162000Z "	HA 11-18	Q-24	6	"
191100Z "	HA 11-25	Q-26	9	"
182110Z "	Konum 3-16	Q-93	6	II CORPS
190300Z "	HA 11-25	Q-93	6	MACARTHUR
191100Z "	HA 11-27	Q-80	6	"

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>CODE NAME</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>OPERATION</u>
192040Z Nov	HA 11-21	Q-18	9	MACARTHUR
192300Z Nov	HA 11-30	Q-07	6	"
200415Z "	HA 11-22	Q-1	6	"
202050Z "	HA 11-24	Q-42	9	"
211910Z "	KJEI 24-01	Q-50	6	II CORPS
212050Z "	HA 11-23	Q-71	6	MACARTHUR
220025Z "	KJEI 24-02	Q-89	6	II CORPS
221930Z "	HA 11-32	Q-23	6	MACARTHUR
230840Z "	HA 11-40	Q-05	6	"
232000Z "	HA 11-34	Q-61	6	"
241050Z "	HA 11-42	Q-84	9	"
242000Z "	11-323	Q-46	9	II CORPS
250720Z "	HA 11-36	Q-55	9	MACARTHUR
252050Z "	HA 11-41	Q-8	9	"
260400Z "	11-322	Q-12	12	II CORPS
262150Z "	HA 11-33	Q-49	9	MACARTHUR
281015Z "	HA 11-37	Q-64	3	"
301705Z "	11-324	Q-52	9	II CORPS
011935Z Dec	HA 11-43	Q-48	6	MACARTHUR
022220Z "	HA 11-47	Q-72	6	"
041950Z "	HA 11-48	Q-60	9	"
112310Z "	BA 4-4	R-37	9	PERSHING
121000Z "	HA 12-4	R-58	6	MACARTHUR
122300Z "	HA 12-1	R-59	6	"
132110Z "	HA 12-5	R-2	9	"
142145Z "	HA 12-2	R-66	6	"
162130Z "	HA 12-6	R-13	3	"
192120Z "	1	R-10	9	3TH SFG
261140Z "	HA 12-7	R-79	6	MACARTHUR

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DATE	NAME	CODE NAME	SORTIES	OPERATION
310300Z Dec	HA 12-14	S-68	9	MACARTHUR
020633Z Jan	BA 20-1	S-53	9	PERSHING
050543Z Jan	DB 04-1	S-09	6	9th BOK
060533Z "	HA 1-1	S-86	9	MACARTHUR
070449Z "	HA 1-2	S-05	9	"
071913Z "	BA 23-8	O-39	5	PERSHING
080605Z "	HA 1-5	S-58	9	MACARTHUR
131408Z "	AA 1	S-06	9	SULTAN
172155Z "	HA 1-6	S-79	9	MACARTHUR
180914Z "	HA 1-7	S-34	9	"

## d. (C) Army Aviation Operations:

(1) The major objectives in employing the aviation assets available to IFFORCEV are:

(a) Provide airmobility to combat elements of Free World Forces in II Corps Tactical Zone.

(b) Support the aerial reconnaissance and surveillance programs (Staff supervision of G-1 allocations changed from G-2 to Aviation).

## (2) Resources available:

### (a) Assault helicopter companies (AHC):

COMPANY	UNIT SUPPORTED
57th AHC	GS, Highlands
119th AHC	XS, Prairie Fire
170th AHC	DS, 4th Inf Div
189th AHC	DS, 4th Inf Div
155th AHC	DS, ARVN
192d AHC	DS, 3/506th AEC
92d AHC	GS, Coastal
281st AHC	DS, Special Forces
48th AHC	DS, ARVN
129th AHC	DS, GRID
134th AHC	GS, Coastal
61st AHC	GS, Coastal
355th AHC	DS, 173d Abn

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(b) Assault support helicopter companies (ASHC):

179th ASHC	DS, 4th Inf Div
243d ASHC	GS, Coastal
180th ASHC	GS, Coastal/Highlands
196th ASHC	GS, Coastal/Highlands

(c) The 183d, 185th, 203d, and 219th Reconnaissance Airplane Companies support the II CTZ VR program and provide GS II CTZ.

(d) The 225th Surveillance Airplane Company is employed throughout the II CTZ in a surveillance role.

(3) Major accomplishments:

(a) Airmobility was provided to the following US operations for the period indicated:

OPERATION	SUPPORTED UNIT	AVN UNIT	DURATION
PERSHING	1st Cav Div (AM)	Organic	1 Nov-31 Jan
BOLLING	173d Abn	335th AHC 180th ASHC	1 Nov-31 Jan
KLAMATH FALLS	1/101st Abn	92d AHC 243d ASHC	1 Dec-8 Jan
MCCLAIN	3/506th Abn	192d AHC 243d ASHC	20 Jan-31 Jan
MCARTHUR	4th Inf Div	170th AHC 189th AHC 179th ASHC	1 Nov-31 Jan

(b) The daily ROKA support was provided by the 48th and 129th AHCs and the 180th and 196th ASHCs. Additional support was provided, on a mission basis, for major ROKA operations. Major operations supported with additional aircraft were:

1. GRID:

OPERATION	DURATION
SO TANG 67-3	21 Nov - 27 Nov 67
HAE SANJIN 1	9 Dec - 17 Dec 67
MAEJONG HO 9-1	17 Dec - 31 Dec 67
MAEJONG HO 9-2	9 Jan - 30 Jan 68

2. WERID:

MAJEA 1	22 Nov - 23 Nov 67
MADOO 3	18 Dec - 22 Dec 67
JOO MA 3	20 Dec - 21 Dec 67
BAK-GEU	20 Dec - 21 Dec 67

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<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>DURATION</u>
SUNG MA 3	29 Dec - 30 Dec 67
DA CHONG SAN	6 Jan - 13 Jan 68
CHUL MA 1	14 Jan - 18 Jan 68
POK FOONG	27 Jan - 1 Feb 68

(c) Throughout the period CH54 support was provided to I and II CTZs on a mission basis by the 1st Cav Div. (AM) aircraft.

(d) In addition, special requirements directed by MACV were supported. These included Reconco School, Prairie Fire, Delta, and DSA II Corps support.

(4) During the period, all UH-1H helicopter replacements for UH-1D helicopters did not arrive and the scheduled completion of exchange has not been completed. Current plans call for turn over of 13 UH-1Ds in all AHGs by 15 Feb 68 and complete exchange in all AHGs by the end of the next reporting period. Presently ten of the thirteen (-) AHGs have completed exchange to UH-1Hs and two of the remaining three companies are in the exchange process as stated above.

## e. (U) Organization and Training Activities:

(1) All units that are assigned, attached or under operational control of this headquarters as of 31 January 1967 are listed at Incl 7.

(2) The command relationship of major US, ARVN and FMAF units within II CTZ is at Incl 8.

(3) The following units were assigned, attached, or became OPCON to IFFORCEV during the period:

(a) 5th Battalion (175mm)(SP) 22d Artillery assigned by USARV GO 6496, 18 December 1967.

(b) 241st, 242d, 243d and 244th Field Artillery Detachments (Radar) assigned by USARV GO 5791, 10 November 1967.

(c) 3d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry (1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division) OPCON by MACV message (S) MACCOCIL 01603, 15110Z January 1968, EYRD 40 (U).

(d) 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, OPCON during the period 1 December 67 to 8 January 68.

(4) The following units were reassigned from IFFORCEV to the 108th Artillery Group in support of III MAF in I CTZ during the period:

(a) 8th Battalion (175mm)(SP) 4th Artillery.

(b) 1st Battalion (105mm)(SP) 40th Artillery.

(c) 1st Battalion (AM)(SP) 44th Artillery.

(d) 2d Battalion (175mm)(SP) 94th Artillery.

(e) Battery G (Searchlight) 29th Artillery.

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(f) 235th FA Detachment (Radar).

(g) 238th FA Detachment (Radar).

(h) 239th FA Detachment (Radar).

(i) 240th FA Detachment (Radar).

(5) Manpower Authorizations: Effective 15 January 1968, the infantry battalions of standard infantry divisions, mechanized infantry battalions and armor battalions were reorganized into standard configurations as recommended during USAFV Phase 1 Standardization Conference in August 1967 and submitted to DA.

(6) Training:

(a) Training inspections of all assigned and attached units, less artillery groups and battalions, were conducted during the quarter. All units were rated satisfactory. Future inspections will be conducted semi-annually.

(b) IFFORCEV Regulation 350-2 was published 3 January 1968. It prescribes policy and provides guidance for all units assigned and attached to Headquarters IFFORCEV in planning, conducting and supervising military training. Emphasis is placed on the conduct of replacement training and weapons familiarization.

(7) Research and development (R&D) activities: requests for information on various R&D items from USARV and ACTIV were monitored by this headquarters. No ENSURE requests were received from OPCON units.

f. (C) Psychological Operations:

(1) General:

(a) Psychological operations (PSYOP) were conducted by GVN, US and ROK Forces in the II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) supported by the 8th PSYOP Battalion, the 9th Air Command Squadron (ACS), Nha Trang and Pleiku, the 4th PSYOP Group, Saigon, the 7th PSYOP Group, Okinawa, the 2d US Coastal Zone "Junk and Swift Boat" Fleet, the ROK Forces Civil Affairs/PSYOP Company, the 20th POLMAR Battalion (AKVN) and the 114th Liaison Squadron (VNAF).

(b) The operations involved disseminating 503,734,000 leaflets, of which 45,895 were printed by the 8th PSYOP Bn and 1,371 hours of aerial loudspeaker time directed against targets in enemy areas. In addition, leaflet, loudspeaker and other propaganda activities were conducted before, during and after tactical and revolutionary development operations in friendly areas.

1. The objectives of PSYOP prior to tactical and revolutionary development operations were to:

a. Explain the ChieuHoi Program to VC/NVA and local populace including specific instructions on how to rally, repeated assurances of good treatment, and attempts to reach the VC through appeals to their families.

b. Persuade the populace in VC/NVA controlled areas to expose VC/NVA personnel including members of the infrastructure.

c. Persuade the populace to deny supplies and rice to VC/NVA elements.

d. Build popular support for the GVN in contested areas.

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g. Foster population control by dissemination of safety instructions and other measures.

2. The objectives of PSYOP during tactical operations were to:

a. Demoralize VC/NVA troops.

b. Stimulate defections in VC/NVA ranks.

goal of the "Open Arms" program.

d. Alienate the VC/NVA forces from the popu-

lace.

e. Create a fear of impending doom in VC/NVA personnel should they continue to fight.

3. The objectives of PSYOP subsequent to tactical operations were to:

a. Assure control of the population and orient it towards support of the GVN.

b. Exploit recent combat casualties and pressures as a means of stimulating VC/NVA defections.

(c) Examples of leaflets printed by the 9th PSYOP Bn during the period:

1. A Chieu Hoi Returnee's Message. Incl 9.

2. A Tet Leaflet Exploiting Family Separation. Incl 10.

3. A Pacification Health Leaflet. Incl 11.

(d) Emphasis on coordination and integration of the myriad of PSYOP activities conducted and planned was the predominate theme in the military PSYOP/Chieu Hoi field. Consolidation of the Military PSYOP and Chieu Hoi functions was completed with the formation of a Chieu Hoi/Military PSYOP Division under one chief. The interrelated phases of the Chieu Hoi/Mil PSYOP Program, inducement, reception, exploitation, training, resettlement, and follow-up became unified.

1. On 27 December 1968 IVFORCEV published a plan for Chieu Hoi/Dai Doan Ket Programs during the 1968 Tet season. A salient feature of this plan was that the Province Senior Advisors and their staffs were given the responsibility for centralized planning, coordination and advisory assistance for the entire US PSYOP Tet Campaign. Leaflet stocks made available through the 8th PSYOP Bn were allocated to the provinces. All operators were required to coordinate their efforts with the Province Advisory Team. This new approach resulted in a substantial decrease in duplication of effort and improvement in consistency of themes targeted against a given audience. Additionally, greater emphasis was placed on the use of information channels to convince US personnel that intelligence and PSYOP benefits would accrue from the proper treatment and rapid reporting of Hoi Chanhs.

2. During this period the Province Senior Advisors reported that the civilian PSYOP activities in the information and nation building fields, the Military PSYOP effort against enemy units and the Chieu Hoi Program were being carried forward as an integrated effort.

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Although the degree of coordination between these programs varies between provinces, an increasing number of Province PSYOP Committees and Province PSYOP sections headed by a US advisor should provide an increasingly favorable impact.

2. Planning commenced during this period for establishment of a Nha Trang based Combined Propaganda Support Center (CPSC) for the Coastal Provinces. The CPSC, US and ROK manned, will initially coordinate requests for PSYOP aircraft support. In order to reach its full potential plans call for the CPSC to include GVN forces and undertake the coordination of PSYOP printing and tape production requests.

(f) Renewed efforts were made to assure more complete exploitation of Hoi Chanh (ralliers) for intelligence and PSYOP purposes.

1. A coordinated list of PSYOP interrogation requirements was distributed to US OPCON units for use in interrogation of Hoi Chanh and PW's.

2. The Chief, Chieu Hoi/Military PSYOP Division of COMUSMACV was appointed a member of the II Corps Intelligence Collection and Exploitation Committee (ICEC). The province Military PSYOP advisors were also appointed to the province ICEC Committees. These arrangements should improve the integration of the PSYOP and intelligence communities in the attack on the infrastructure.

(g) On 20 January 1968 a 50 kw radio station targeted against VC/NVA units began operating at Pleiku as a six month test of this propaganda media. Programming for this station is provided by the ARVN General Political Warfare Department. Technical support for operation of the Radio Transmitting Set AN/TIT-22 and associated equipment is provided by a detachment from the 7th PSYOP Group, Okinawa. Mini radio-receivers with a fixed frequency of the station have been distributed by hand and air drop in target areas. Arrangements have been made to evaluate the project through interrogation of PW and Hoi Chanh. This evaluation will seek to determine whether a propaganda radio capability should be an integral part of US PSYOP support units in Vietnam.

(h) At the outbreak of the enemy's Tet offensive, IFFORCEV directed a saturation PSYOP effort to exploit new vulnerabilities presented as the enemy's drive failed. Special leaflets were produced emphasizing the failure of the enemy to receive popular support, his failure to honor the Tet holiday and the violation of his self-proclaimed truce. The Chieu Hoi/Military PSYOP Division operated a PSYOP Tactical Operation Center to receive and process requests for PSYOP media and aircraft support. Desk officers coordinated the requests of tactical units and provinces. This system enabled the 8th PSYOP Bn to concentrate solely on production and dissemination of material.

### (2) Support:

(a) On 1 Dec 67 the 8th PSYOP Bn was activated to replace the 245th PSYOP Co as the principal military PSYOP agency supporting operations within II CTZ. The battalion has 20 officers and 63 enlisted men. Co A is located in Nha Trang and operates together with C Flight, 9th ACS to provide PSYOP support for the Coastal provinces. Co B was organized at Pleiku to work with B Flight, 9th ACS on supporting the Highland provinces. By the close of the reporting period a battalion staff was functioning, a Propaganda Development Center had been established, and construction of a new battalion headquarters was nearly completed. This upgrading of the military PSYOP support agency to battalion status should markedly improve the quantity and quality of the PSYOP efforts.

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(b) The 8th PSYOP Bn maintained a total of five loudspeaker (HB) and five audio-visual (HE) field teams for support of operations. For the first time an HE team was attached to a Province Advisory Team. This arrangement enabled the audio-visual team to support US tactical units, cordon and search operations and a variety of revolutionary development programs.

(c) The 9th ACS flew 284 missions, disseminated 450,518,000 leaflets and provided 1102 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts. Fifteen night missions were flown by C-47 aircraft. The full potential of the 9th ACS to support night missions has not been realized because of the non-availability of navigational equipment required for the O2R to have a night capability. The diversion of PSYOP C47 aircraft to flare missions has also had an adverse effect.

(d) The 1968 II CTZ Tet Plan provided for use of HU-1 helicopters to augment aircraft support during the high intensity Tet period. At the end of January two helicopters rigged with ABS-4, 1,000 watt loudspeaker systems, were rendering invaluable support to the Tet Program.

(e) The 8th PSYOP Bn has received and employed one Modular Audio-Visual Unit (MAVU). This equipment has performed successfully in a variety of field conditions. It provides substantially the same capability as the audio-visual jeepster (except for the vehicle) at a substantially lower cost. This readily transportable equipment is particularly suitable for support of nation building PSYOP efforts.

## g. (C) Chemical:

### (1) General:

(a) Herbicide Operations have been characterized by inordinate delay from initiation of the request until the mission has been executed. This has pertained to aerial spray missions in particular. A new apparatus has been introduced into the II CTZ which will facilitate and expedite crop denial or defoliation missions in approved areas which are too small for C-123 strikes. The Agavenco Sprayer, originally designed to disperse insecticides has been found to be effective in herbicide operations. The Agavenco sprayer is a relatively simple apparatus and can be quickly and easily mounted in a UH-1 helicopter. It will spray an area of approximately 20 hectares.

(b) Riot Control Agents received wide acclaim for their effectiveness in the battles of Tam Quan and Dak To. A shortage of most types of CS munitions still exists because of their experimental status. The latest allocation to IFFORCEV was for 95 E-158 CS Canister Clusters, 160 E-8 Tactical CS Launchers, and 179 40mm CS Grenades to be suballocated to the 1st Cav Div (AM), the 4th Inf Div and the 173d Abn Bde. The Capital ROZ Infantry Division used CS extensively in Operation MAREK HO 9.

(c) Personnel Detectors are continuing to provide commanders with valid information on the location of enemy personnel.

### (2) Herbicide Operations:

(a) The results of Air Force, C-123, herbicide missions are as follows:

PROVINCE	NO. OF SORTIES	HECTARES DEFOLIATED	METRIC TONS CROP DESTROYED
Binh Dinh	3		336

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PROVINCE	NO. OF SORTIES	HECTARES DEFOLIATED	METRIC TONS CROP DESTROYED
Binh Thuan	3	360	
Kontum	18	1,968	
Lam Dong	23	2,101	424
Phu Yen	6	684	
Platku	108	12,028	
Quang Duc	66	7,494	

(b) The results of US Army, UH-1 and CH-47, herbicide missions are as follows:

## 1. 1st Cav Div (AM):

a. Thirteen CH-47 and 12 UH-1 helicopter sorties were flown to defoliate the Camp Radcliff perimeter, various Landing Zones (LZs) and possible ambush sites along Highway 19.

b. Two UH-1 helicopter sorties were flown to destroy rice seedling beds in the An Lao Valley.

2. 4th Inf Div: Five UH-1 helicopter sorties were flown to defoliate possible ambush sites along Highway 7B in Northwest Phu Bon Province and highway 512 west of Dak To.

3. 173d Abn Bde: Four CH-47 and 16 UH-1 helicopter sorties were flown to destroy enemy crops in the BOMANG AO.

## (3) Riot Control Agent (RCA) Operations:

### (a) Friendly Employment:

1. The 1st Cav Div (AM) reported the expenditure of the following CS munitions:

a. During the battle of Tam Quan 1,728 M7A3 grenades and four E-158 CS canister clusters were employed, followed with air strikes, artillery and ground troops.

b. In addition to the battle of Tam Quan, 18 E-158s were employed followed by air strikes and artillery and 1,152 M7A3 grenades were fired in support of troops in contact.

c. Approximately 7,680 lbs (96 drums) of bulk CS-1 were dropped from CH-47 helicopters to contaminate enemy fortifications and restrict the use of trails.

d. CS employment contributed directly to 26 enemy KIA by artillery and Aerial Rocket Artillery.

2. The 4th Inf Div reported the expenditure of the following CS munitions:

a. During the battle of Dak To, approximately 6400 lbs (80 drums) of bulk CS-1 were dropped from CH-47 helicopters to contaminate possible exfiltration routes. The drops were followed by conventional artillery. Eight E-158 CS Canister Clusters were employed and followed with gunships, air strikes and an arc light strike.

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b. In addition to the CS employed in support of troops at Dak To, LA B-158s were dropped from UH-1 helicopters and followed by conventional artillery and air strikes. Two hundred thirty-nine drums (19,120 lbs) of bulk CS-1 were dropped to contaminate infiltration routes near the Cambodian border.

3. Republic of Korea Forces: The Capital ROK Division dropped approximately 36,000 lbs (450 drums) of bulk CS-1 and employed 100 E-8 Tactical CS Launchers during operation MACHO NO 9.

(b) Enemy Employment:

1. On 28 December 1967, the enemy attacked the Trang Phuoc Special Forces Camp (vicinity ZV 025266) with eleven mortar rounds containing a mixture of Riot Control Agent CS and CM.

2. A document captured on 11 January 1968 by Delta Company 2/503 Abn (vicinity AR 975709) included a request to the chemical section of the E3 Front from the Gia Lai Provincial Headquarters for the distribution of 2,000 protective masks to various units within the Gia Lai area (all of Pleiku Province and the mountainous areas of Binh Dinh Province). They further requested chemical mines and grenades for issue to guerrilla units in the area. The Provincial Headquarters recommended that a semi-professional antichemical operations net be established in districts and villages, and that each district or concentrated Battalion be authorized to have a cadre in charge of chemical operations.

(4) Personnel Detectors:

(a) The 1st Cav Div (AM) has two Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD) and 12 Manpack Personnel Detectors (MPD). Twelve APD missions were flown. The locations of maximum readings which were verified by aerial reconnaissance were attacked by artillery and air strikes resulting in four NV killed and three automatic weapons positions and 135 bunkers destroyed. Manpack Personnel Detector missions are flown by the Brigades.

(b) The 4th Inf Div has two Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD) and eight Manpack Personnel Detectors (MPD). During this reporting period 169 APD missions were flown. The coordinates of maximum readings were reported to the Bde S-2s and the Division G-2. On 4 December 1967, an APD ship was downed by ground fire, resulting in four US personnel KIA. All MPD missions are flown by the brigades.

(c) The 173d Abn Bde has one Airborne Personnel Detector and four Manpack Personnel Detectors. Missions are flown daily with maximum utilization of personnel and equipment.

(d) USARV has requested that operational quantities of Airborne Personnel Detectors be made available to tactical units. Manpack Personnel Detectors will be phased out of the system as APDs become available.

(5) Summary:

(a) Herbicide Operations:

1. There were 227 herbicide C-123 sorties flown resulting in 24,633 hectares of forested area defoliated and an estimated 604 metric tons of enemy crops destroyed.

2. Units under Headquarters, I FFORCEV OPCON are continuing to attack enemy rice seedling beds and to perform perimeter

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defoliation using organic locally fabricated sprayers flown in UH-1 and CH-47 Helicopters. Agavenco Sprayers will replace these locally fabricated sprayers.

(b) Riot control Agent (RCA) Operations:

1. The battles of Tam Quan and Dak To proved the effectiveness of RCA (CS) employed to force the enemy from fortified positions. Once the enemy was out of his bunker, artillery and air strikes were more effective.

2. Munitions containing CS are still in short supply, requiring units to use them mainly against confirmed enemy troop locations.

3. The enemy employed RCA (CS and CN) against a Special Forces Camp. A captured enemy document indicated the enemy plans to distribute 2,000 protective masks and to acquire chemical mines and grenades for issue to units in the Gia Lai area (all of Pleiku Province and the mountainous areas of Binh Dinh Province).

(c) Personnel Detectors:

1. Units under Headquarters, I FFORCEV OrCON have a total of five AFD's and 24 MPD's. There are eight MPD's in the I FFORCEV float. Missions are flown daily to assist in locating the enemy.

2. MPD's will be phased out as AFD's are received in operational quantities. This is tentatively scheduled for November 1968.

4. (C) Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.

a. General:

(1) During 1967, significant improvements occurred in the area of pacification planning. As the year began, there was little integration of planning efforts between US civil and military elements and even less between US civil elements and RVNAF. By the end of the year, constant and close contact had evolved between CORDS and G3 planners, I FFORCEV. Close coordination also exists between ARVN II Corps and the US Advisory staff. In addition improved liaison between all pacification planners, US, GVN and ROK is now an accomplished fact. At the province level, pacification is now being accomplished by consolidated effort which results in GVN pacification programs being coordinated with ROK forces.

(2) The 1968 II CTZ Combined Campaign Plan (CCP) was developed as a combined document in every sense of the word. Although it was not signed formally by CG, ROKFV-FC, his staff participated fully in its development and he has accepted in principle its provisions as they apply in his TACR. Further, a ROKFV-FC plan for CY 1968 has been published which parallels the US/GVN document. Combined planning has now been extended to the province level. For example, the RD Guidelines and the CCP have been incorporated into a provincial plan which covers all aspects of pacification and nation building. This provincial plan is the blueprint by which support provided by the USAID Country Assistance Program can be used fully integrated into the efforts of II CTZ, during 1968.

(3) RVNAF Support of Pacification emphasized increasing quantity and improving effectiveness of RF/PF units. At end CY 1967 Regional Force (RF) companies in direct support of RD had been increased from 60 to 74 and Popular Force (PF) platoons from 190 to 229. Efforts

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to improve effectiveness centered around Mobile Training Teams provided from US units. The objective is to have these US teams give each RF company and 75 percent of the PF platoons in direct support of RD an intensive training course in small unit tactics by 30 June 1968. Also, the program of RF/PF units receiving on-the-job training with US units will continue with increased emphasis.

(4) The US and FVMAF primary support of RD has been and will continue to be that of providing an overall umbrella of security. This is accomplished by maintaining constant pressure on NVA and VC main force units to prevent their missing for coordinated attacks of battalion size or larger. In the event the enemy does mass, the mission of US and FVMAF forces is to destroy him before he can execute planned attacks.

### b. New Life Development (NLD)

In the long range aspects of pacification and nation building the various field programs such as Agriculture, Public Administration, Engineering, Education, Self-Help, Youth Affairs, Ethnic Minority Affairs, Warehouse and Transportation, suffered from the same basic problems:

(1) Lack of trained cadre

(2) Inadequate GVN transportation for personnel and movement of commodities and supplies.

(3) Lack of cooperation between GVN technical services in the performance of allied functions and general apathy.

(4) Lack of overall security on a continuous basis. Travel to and operations in numerous areas are a must if NLD Programs are to be fully effective.

### c. Civil Affairs Operations.

(1) Staff responsibilities include the monitoring of all civil affairs activities and specifically the civic action programs of all OPCON units, advisory teams and installation coordinators in II CTZ. The Civil Affairs Branch maintains a civic action fund to support the advisory effort.

(2) RVNAF participation in military civic action is a matter of continuous and special advisory emphasis. The recent emphasis on PF housing has yet to bear fruit, but should improve PF participation in civic action projects throughout II CTZ.

(3) Command emphasis has been placed on US units to coordinate their civic action programs with the Province Senior advisor concerned. Coordination with local PSYOPS officer is encouraged to publicize and support all CA projects with credit to RVNAF whenever possible.

(4) 41st Civil Affairs Company.

(a) Significant operations during the period included detaching one civil affairs team from the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) and employing it in area support of the Binh Dinh Province Senior advisor. The unit now has two teams in a command support role. Both are attached to the 4th Infantry Division. Four teams are attached to III M.F. and are not available for use in II Corps. The nine remaining teams are in an area support role in the following provinces: Binh Dinh (4), Binh Thuan (3), Pleiku (1), Dariao (1) and Phu Yen (1).

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(b) The modified unit TOL received during the period provides for 16 generalist teams rather than the 16 V. refugee oriented teams. Current problems of inadequate equipment and maintenance facilities should be alleviated by implementation of the modified TOL.

### (5) Refugee Operations.

(a) At the end of the quarter all provinces which need a fulltime refugee officer had at least one assigned and present for duty.

(b) When the GVN Special Commissariat for Refugees was absorbed by the Minister for Social Welfare and Refugees some fluctuation occurred among GVN personnel and added new advisory responsibilities in the Social Welfare area.

(c) The results of the streamlining mentioned in the last quarterly report are being realized in more rapid communications and response thereto. Reporting and the validity of the statistical base has improved and monitoring of programs is more positive.

### 3. Public Safety Division

(1) National Police (NP) and National Police Field Forces (NPF). Recruitment increased dramatically during the latter part of November and December and indications are that this increase will continue through January. Increased pay and allowances and the General Mobilization Decree which liberalized the draft laws, are the principal reasons for the favorable recruitment picture.

(2) NPF strength in II Corps is now approximately 1,100 and organized into 12 companies (eight operational, one in training and three being recruited). Four additional companies are authorized but they have not progressed beyond the planning stage.

(3) The assignment of a full-time US advisor to each NPF company is the principal reason for recruiting increases.

(4) National Identity Card (NIC) Program. Discrepancies in contract purchases have delayed the inception of the NIC at the national level which resulted in a corresponding delay at Corps level. The additional time generated by delays in Saigon will be used at II Corps to complete inspections and thereby insure that all is in readiness when the program is implemented. The current estimate for the start of the II Corps NIC program is mid-May 1968.

(5) Resources Control Operations. By decree, the DGMF, Saigon abolished the Resources Control Bloc and reduced it to the status of a section within the Uniform Branch. This accomplishment is a step forward in implementing the concept of overall police action rather than specialized methods in resources control. Advisors are closely monitoring the transition to insure compliance at the lower echelons.

(6) A site for constructing an in-service training academy is being prepared at Pleiku. Construction will be done on a self-help, nonfunded basis and when completed the academy will be used both as a preparatory training center to provide Montagnard recruits some basic education before attendance at N. High School as well as in-service training for NP.

(7) Prisons and Detention Centers. A bid for new construction at the Lalat prison has been accepted and work should begin early in

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the first quarter CY 1968. Special attention has been given to the An Tuc Detention Center in Binh Dinh and a US Army NCO is on site to monitor construction. The Center is expected to be completed by 1 February 1968.

(8) NP Construction: Construction of funded projects was at a standstill during this reporting period. Funds have been authorized for numerous projects to include renovations of regional, provincial and district facilities; building of warehouses and other physical plants including construction of a regional training center in Cam Ranh city, however the release of funds by Saigon has not occurred.

### 5. (C) Logistical activities:

a. The primary US logistical effort during the period was devoted to PAKSHING, MACARTHUR, BOLLING, EYRD, KLANATH FALLS and MCLAIN.

b. A major logistical problem developed in MACARTHUR at Dak To on 15 November 1967 when the Forward Support Area (FSA) ammunition storage area was destroyed by enemy fire. Intensified resupply of Class V by land and air prevented curtailment of combat operations.

c. ACOFS, G4 continued to monitor the materiel and supply posture of units assigned, attached and CPOON to this headquarters. The stock status and scheduled resupply of the following FSA's was monitored daily:

(1) English FSA, in support of PAKSHING.

(2) Dak To FSA, in support of MACARTHUR.

(3) Phan Thiet FSA, in support of EYRD (subsequently renamed MCLAIN).

d. During the reporting period, the G4 staff identified problems and initiated remedial action intended to improve the logistical support systems of Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PP), Army of Vietnam (ARVN) and ROKFV forces within II Corps Tactical Zone. Examples of these actions include:

(1) Continued assistance of ROK Forces, Vietnam in requesting real estate in the Nha Trang area for base development.

(2) Conceptual approval and schedule of quarterly visits for composite team visits to provinces to discuss and solve administrative and logistical problems. The team will include representatives of operational and logistical advisors and Vietnamese counterparts, and staff officers from this headquarters. The composite team will allow for more rapid solution of province problems and reduction of coordination by electrical means.

(3) Establishment of a program to get maintenance and supply contact assistance teams at various levels to visit all RF/PP and ARVN units to improve their logistical posture.

(4) Closely monitor RF/PP and ARVN logistical posture and infuse US logistical assets where appropriate and critically needed.

(5) Eliminate bottlenecks in Government of Vietnam military dependent housing improvement programs.

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(6) Restore availability of barrier materials within III Corps Tactical Zone to a responsive level.

(7) Monitor camp conversions from Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) to RF units.

e. Supply: There are no existing shortages which impair the operational capability of this command significantly. However, shortages of AN/PRC-25 radios, aircraft cargo slings and fire fighting equipment cause serious concern, and should be alleviated as soon as possible.

(1) Classes I, II, III, IV and V supplies are adequate to support all operations.

(2) Emphasis placed on the turn-in of unneeded TOE/MTOE equipment resulted in the reporting of 274 line items and supply action on 7430 separate items ranging from 2 1/2 ton trucks to lensatic compasses.

(3) Changes that occurred to the Available Supply Rate (ASR) control of ammunition expended during the period were:

(a) Additions:

1. Cartridge (CTG), 40mm, HE, B568
2. CTG, 81mm, Illum, C226.
3. CTG, 81mm, HE, C246.
4. Grenade, Smoke, Yellow, G945.
5. Rocket, 2.75", HE, H490.
6. Mine, AP, M18, K143 (Claymore).
7. Signal, Ground, White Star Glusier, L307.
8. Flare, Trip, M49, L495.
9. Chemical Agent, CS-1 (Bulk), K764.
10. CTG, 60mm, HE (B626 added 24 Jan 68, even though weapons are not authorized).
11. CTG, 60mm Illum (B627 added 24 Jan 68, even though weapons are not authorized).
12. CTG, 60mm AP (B630 added 24 Jan 68, even though weapons are not authorized).

(b) Deletions:

1. CTG, 40mm, HE, B568.
2. CTG 60mm, Illum, B627 (because weapons were not authorized).

(c) End of period:

1. CTG, 81mm, Illum, C226.
2. CTG, 81mm, HE, C246.

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3. CTG, 105mm, HE, G445
4. Projectile, 175mm, HE, D572
5. Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Yellow G945
6. Rocket, 2.75", HE, H490
7. Mine, AP, M18, K143 (Claymore)
8. Chemical Agent, CS-1 (Bulk), K764
9. Signal, Ground; White Star Cluster, L307
10. Signal, Ground, White Star Parachute, L312
11. Flare, Trip, M49, L495
12. CTG, 60mm HE (B626)
13. CTG, 60mm Illum (B627)
14. CTG, 60mm WP (B630)

(4) All major critical items of equipment have been issued to Company E, 20th Infantry (Long Range Patrol) except tool kits. Of the 189 requisitions submitted, 26 remain unfilled and six are only partially filled.

f. Services: Nothing significant to report.

g. Transportation:

(1) Highway QL-21 was opened again during December 1967, for the resupply of Ban Me Thuot by US convoys from Cam Ranh Bay and ARVN convoys from Nha Trang. Highway QL-1 has been opened between Phan Rang and Phan Thiet and remains in a Green (open) condition.

(2) The tempo of daily airlift operations throughout II Corps Tactical Zone has raised the daily airlift requirements to a new high. The daily averages of emergency airlift for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 compared with daily averages of the previous quarter as follows:

<u>QUARTER</u>	<u>SHORT TONS</u>	<u>PASSENGERS</u>
August - October 1967	78	109
November 1967 - January 1968	243	293

(3) The II Corps Tactical Zone Highway Traffic Regulating Headquarters commenced operations on 10 January 68.

h. (U) MEDICAL:

(1) Hospitalizations: The 71st Evacuation Hospital at Pleiku became fully operational in October just prior to the heavy combat at Dak To. The hospital received nearly all of the casualties from that action.

(2) Evacuations: The 571st Medical Company (Air Ambulance) arrived in Vietnam during the quarter bringing the total helicopter

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ambulances in 44th Medical brigade units in the II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) to 49. A few of these are not available for support of I FFORCEV units as the 55th Medical Group has a mission of providing evacuation support to Army units in I CTZ and the detachment in I CTZ must be augmented to accomplish the mission. The increase in helicopter ambulances has brought about a much more satisfactory situation.

### 6. (C) Personnel and Administrative Action

#### a. Maintenance of Unit Strengths:

(1) HQ I FFORCEV key personnel and FMAR senior commanders are at Incl 12.

(2) Personnel strengths of assigned and attached units have been satisfactory throughout the reporting period. Key MOS shortages in the 54th Signal Battalion were partially alleviated through a USARV-directed priority fill in MOS 31M (Radio Relay and Carrier Attendant) and MOS 05B (Radio teletype Operator). While artillery strength declined during the first month of the reporting period due to non-availability of qualified artillery replacements arriving incountry, USARV directed a diversion of personnel with MOS 11E (Armor Crewman) and 11R (Infantry Direct Fire Crewman) for duty and training as automatic weapons artillerymen. Through an extensive on-the-job training for these personnel, a high level of combat readiness was maintained. A problem still exists in obtaining qualified radar personnel for 8th TAB, 26th Artillery. This has been reported to USARV, and that headquarters has given this command priority fill in MOS 17E (Radar Crewman) until the problem is eradicated. The 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery arrived on 25 Dec 67 at full strength. The infusion plan of this battalion with other artillery battalions within I FFORCEV was forwarded to USARV. The I FFORCEV infusion program has merged into the USARV controlled infusion plan and is progressing smoothly.

(3) Personnel strengths of assigned, attached and units under operational control are at Incl 13.

#### b. Personnel Management:

(1) Since August 1967, I FFORCEV has experienced difficulty in obtaining sufficient artillery Lieutenant Colonels recommended for command and qualified for key staff positions in Force Artillery and I FFORCEV staff. In a DA-USARV message exchange, Artillery Branch stated that it can, in a twelve month period, provide command recommended artillery lieutenant colonels on the basis of one per battalion and only an additional 40 percent for other assignments. On this basis, the I FFORCEV allocation of command recommended O-5's is: one per battalion (12) and 5 (for staff positions) for a total of 17. However, I FFORCEV is authorized 26 artillery O-5's for all positions including staff assignments. Unless DA increases the basis for assigning command recommended officers or preferential treatment is afforded, I FFORCEV can anticipate assignment of 17 officers suitable for command and approximately 9 artillery O-5's who are not recommended for command. In order to maintain the required quality of staff officers at this headquarters it will be necessary to reject artillery O-5's who are not command recommended and to fill staff positions with officers from other branches.

(2) Due to the critical shortages of Infantry Captains, it has become necessary to fill some infantry positions in the headquarters staff with other combat arms officers. Some enlisted MOS imbalances

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exist as a result of the measures taken to alleviate the artillery shortages mentioned in paragraph 6a (2). As on-the-job training progresses, these imbalances will be overcome.

(3) Lack of timely receipt of copies of DA Form 66's for officers has precluded prompt duty assignments, appointment of sponsors and dispatch of letters of welcome. This headquarters has requested that USARV attempt to obtain an early dispatch of copies of Form 66's from DA. As an interim measure, each incoming officer is being requested through use of a welcome letter to send this headquarters a copy of his Form 66 and assignment preferences. The receipt of timely assignment instructions for personnel nearing rotation also continued to be a problem. Such delays cause personnel hardship and morale problems among those individuals leaving the command. This area should be investigated and continued follow-up action taken by all headquarters to insure prompt and timely action with regard to reassignment instructions.

c. Civilian Personnel Management: Civilian personnel management during the period was generally satisfactory in both administration and pay. Coordination was maintained throughout the quarter between the area civilian personnel officer and all levels of command. USARV regulation 690-1, dtd 3 Dec 67 designated AGPO as staff officers for all Army commands which they support. The delineation of responsibility and authority in this regulation will assist in more efficient civilian personnel administration. During the reporting period justification for Permanent Local National Direct Hire requirements were submitted based on the revised USARV work unit yardstick guide. Actions were taken to transfer 34 authorized spaces from this headquarters to the 17th Avn Gp. These spaces were transferred upon assignment of the 201st Avn Co and 7/17 Cav to the 17th Avn Gp. This headquarters currently has 250 spaces authorized and justification submitted for 296 spaces. Actions are being continued to convert and align wage scales and job descriptions in non-appropriated fund activities to conform with wage scales and grade standards presently used in appropriated fund activities. Controls and guidance on overtime payments were emphasized. Command inspections and those conducted by the Inspector General will inquire into and examine the units concerned for compliance with guidance furnished.

d. Enlisted promotions: Promotion allocations for assigned and attached units are at Incl 14. Utilization of promotion allocations is adequate.

e. Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(1) The Nha Trang area is very much in need of a Special Services Recreational Center. At the present time, Special Services supports a beach facility, but there is an additional need for a recreation center such as the facility at Long Binh; a one or two story building with game room, music room, reading and recreation room, snack bar, etc. With the exception of the USO located in downtown Nha Trang, the only facility in the Nha Trang area that resembles a special services center is the Red Cross building at Camp McDermott. It is desirable to support this facility logistically until the Special Services Office can provide similar facilities of its own and relieve the Red Cross of its requirement to operate a club. Difficulty has been experienced in getting adequate logistical support (i.e. musical instruments, pool tables, tape recorders, day room equipment, etc.) for the Red Cross. This problem has been brought to the attention of the USARV and MACV Special Services officers but no solution has yet been developed.

(2) Utilization of L&K quotas for assigned and attached units were distributed and utilized as shown at Incl 15. There were no significant difficulties experienced during the quarter.

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(3) Awards and decorations approved during the period  
are at Inclosure 16.

(4) Chaplain Activities:

(a) There were no significant personnel changes.

(b) II CTZ has 159 US military chaplains:

139 US Army: 103 Protestant, 35 Catholic, 1  
Jewish 20 US Air Force: 13 Protestant, 7 Catholic

(c) Religious Services:

1. Protestant services in OPCON units and in combat support and service support units is adequate. Services for advisory teams on a regular basis is a practical impossibility. Chaplains assigned to advisory teams do the best they can and depend on neighboring units to render services.

2. Catholic services in OPCON units are adequate.

3. Jewish services are adequate. Services are conducted by the Jewish Chaplain in 9 locations once a month and in Nha Trang every week on the Sabbath. Lay leaders conduct weekly Jewish services at nine locations. Coordination is no problem. One Jewish Chaplain assigned to this headquarters has responsibility for II CTZ. Chanukah services were conducted in the II CTZ for all Jewish personnel during this period.

4. In Nha Trang the following services are scheduled:

a. Sunday, 17 Protestant, 13 Catholic, 1  
Lutheran, 2 Episcopalian.

b. Friday evening, Jewish Sabbath Services

c. Daily, 3 Catholic services.

Services are conducted at the following locations:

HQ I FFORCEV	17th Avn Gp	5th Special Forces Gp
54th Sig Bn	Hq 1st AF	US Air Force Base
459th Sig Bn	8th Field Hospital	Hon Tre Island
	Beach Chapel	Harbor Defense Site

f. Safety and Accident Prevention:

(1) Increased command emphasis at all echelons was placed on safety and accident prevention during the quarter. The military injury rate was lower and the motor vehicle accident rate higher than the previous quarter. However, both rates were lower than the established USARV expectancy ceilings.

<u>QUARTER</u>	<u>INJ RATE</u>	<u>MYR VEH ACC RATE</u>
Jul, Aug, Sep	5.49	.66
Oct, Nov, Dec	3.57	.93

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(2) Injury and motor vehicle accident rates for the quarter are at Inclosure 17.

### g. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order:

(1) Crime Prevention: The Nha Trang area Post Exchanges inventory for the period 11 September 1967 to 10 January 1968 indicate a significant reduction in the percentage of losses to gross sales. Losses during the previous period, 11 May 1967, ranged from .53% to 31.59% of total sales with an average loss of 15.77% for the four exchanges involved in the survey. The results for the four month period ending 10 January 1968 show an overall reduction of average losses ranging from 13.30% to .89% with an average loss of 3.58%. This reduction of losses can be attributed in part to the control and accountability measures implemented by store managers as a result of crime prevention surveys conducted on the four exchanges.

### (2) VIP Security and Special Events Operations:

(a) Continuing requirements for personal security of VIPs and Military Police support of special events operations necessitated the adoption of an agreement between this office and coordinating agencies in the Nha Trang area. At a meeting held on 11 December 1967, representatives from G2, Protocol, HQ Commandant, Aviation and Provost Marshal, I FFOHCEV, USF Security Police and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), USN Harbor Defense, 5th SFG (Abn), Provost Marshal and Public Safety Advisor, Nha Trang, met to discuss and approve a basic plan to provide personal security of VIPs and coordinate planning of special events to include parking and traffic control, safeguarding of property and security of personnel. The plan was agreed upon by all participants and adopted as an SOP to guide in the planning and execution of combined operations.

(b) During the reporting period security was provided for twelve VIP visits without incident. A joint operation for personal security of Chief of Staff, US Army, General Harold K. Johnson, was coordinated with the 9th AOK Division and National Police Officials of Khanh Hoa Province. General Johnson visited several revolutionary development projects in the 9th AOK Division T.O.A. Three special events conducted in the Nha Trang area required the combined efforts of US and Vietnamese military and civilian agencies. These events were Vietnamese National Day ceremonies, 1 November 1967, Commanders Conference held at HQ, 5th SFG (Abn) on 3 December 1968 and a Christmas celebration at the Sergeant's Major villa attended by CofS US Army and CG, I FFOHCEV and staff.

(3) Installation Security Inspection and Practice Test Exercise (PTE): I FFOHCEV Regulation 525-3, subject as above, dated 16 November 1967, requires that a FM representative accompany the I FFOHCEV inspection team on quarterly inspections of ten major US installations in II CTZ. Installation security inspections of all ten major installations were conducted during the period 1 November 1967 to 31 January 1968. PTE were conducted at Pleiku, Phu Cat and Nha Trang. During the PTE phase of the inspection the FM representative observed local military police and USF security police operations in the area of: control of personnel and material entering the installation, traffic control within the installation and on roadways in the local Provost Marshal's area of operation, control of indigenous, third country nationals and FMF personnel, security of sensitive areas and personal security of CG/VIP. The security inspection phase of the inspection immediately

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follows the PTE. It is during this phase that the PM representative surveys physical security measures throughout the installation, with emphasis on defensive measures such as perimeter barriers, control of local employees and perimeter lighting. Through these inspections installation defense commanders are presented a realistic picture of their reaction capability during an unannounced alert and given a thorough inspection of physical security measures.

(4) Prisoners of War:

(a) Processing and Evacuation of PW's: On 12 December 1967 the PW Camp at Phu Tai closed for the receipt of PW's, having reached its maximum established capacity of 1000 PW's. The camp remained closed for a nine day period. During this period evacuation of PW's continued in O'CON and FMARF units from capturing units to collecting points at brigade/division level. At no time during the closure did overcrowding exist within the collecting points. Coordination by this office with MACV-PM and GI advisor, DSA II Corps, resulted in the reopening of the Phu Tai PW camp on 20 Dec 67, upon the transfer of 117 civil defendants (CD's) from the camp to the Binh Dinh Jail. The CD's were transients awaiting return to GVN civil channels.

(b) PW Work Program: The implementation of work programs within II CTZ MACV PW camps was stressed by COMUSMACV during October 1967. Through the gainful employment of PW's, the security hazard posed by idleness and collusion is greatly reduced. In addition, health and morale of PW's has improved by keeping them occupied with useful work projects. Statistics received from the Military Police advisors to the Pleiku and Phu Tai PW Camps show that the employment rate is high in II CTZ PW camps. At the Pleiku Camp, average figures for December show that of 792 PW's interned, 579 were employed daily for an average of 73%. At Phu Tai 475 to 707 PW's were employed on a daily basis for an average of 67%. Non-employable PW's at both sites include officers, physically handicapped and elderly personnel. Both II CTZ camps have an outside work program whereby local US and MACV units utilize PW labor on a daily basis. In-camp work includes projects to better living conditions through repairing existing facilities and making small items of apparel such as shoes and uniforms. A gardening project exists at Pleiku where PW rations are supplemented by self grown food stuffs.

(5) Highway Operations Improvement Program:

(a) The incidence of traffic accidents, injuries and fatalities in II CTZ has risen. Many reasons can be given to explain the rapid rise in the accident rate; some examples are: marked increase in traffic volume, poor convoy discipline and control, lack of courtesy and adherence to safe driving practices on the part of individual drivers, failure of Vietnamese authorities to control VN military and civilian traffic, failure of VN nationals to understand either the nature or the magnitude of the problem presented by modern vehicular traffic and problems occasioned by (3c) third country nationals.

(b) A conference was held on 5 Jan 68, to formulate plans for the improvement of highway operations. Command interest and emphasis was received. List of conferees included G4 and G1 representatives, Transportation Corps personnel, engineer personnel, AOKRV Military Police and US Military Police representation from the Provost Marshal Office, USAFV, Provost Marshal's Office, IFFOACEV, 16th MP GP, Division Provost Marshals and area Provost Marshals.

(c) The formalized IFFOACEV Highway Operations Improvement program is bringing into play the concerted and coordinated

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efforts of all military police assets in II CTZ. Although insufficient time remained in the reporting period to result in a noticeable improvement in traffic safety, the forthcoming quarter will prove whether or not our approach is sound and effective. Actual steps to be taken include, but are not limited to, more stringent enforcement, traffic studies in major cities and other congested areas, coordination with VN civil police agencies in order to influence them to increase their efforts in traffic enforcement, integration of the Traffic Control plan with the Highway Regulation plan, increasing to the degree possible the use of combined patrols utilizing US, ROKFV and VN personnel.

### 7. (C) Artillery:

a. During the period 1 November 1967 through 31 January 1968, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery continued to support United States, Vietnamese and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMF) in II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ).

b. I Field Force Vietnam Artillery units, totaling two artillery groups, eleven battalions, five separate batteries and six detachments, supported all major operations in II CTZ to include Operations BOLLING, BIRD (ICLAIN), MACARTHUR and LASHING. Support was rendered Republic of Korea Forces in the 9th and Capital Infantry division areas of operation during Operations NINH HOA 2, HUONG HO 9, HUNG HOANG 823 and HUE CAN GIN. Support to ARVN forces was rendered throughout II CTZ to units of the 2nd and 23rd ARVN Division, the 24th Special Tactical Zone and provincial defense units.

c. Positioning of heavy artillery: An extensive study of heavy artillery assets within IFFORCEV Artillery resulted in a basic positioning plan which utilizes fully the firepower, accuracy and long range interdiction capability of heavy artillery in II CTZ. From primary firing positions located near major road arteries all heavy artillery batteries have the capability of displacing to supplementary firing positions on short notice, thereby extending coverage and bringing fires on enemy positions considered previously as sanctuaries.

d. Support of Special Forces: IFFORCEV Artillery groups established liaison with special forces B detachments in II CTZ to insure that adequate artillery support is provided special forces camps and operations. Thus far, support has included training assistance at those camps equipped with artillery for forward observers, gun crews and fire direction personnel; providing forward observers and quick fire channels for operations; and exchanging intelligence information.

e. Support of ARVN: IFFORCEV Artillery provided training support for both ARVN artillery and maneuver units during the reporting period. Forward observer training courses were presented to company grade officers of the 40th, 41st, and 47th ARVN Regiments; maintenance and survey courses were presented; and ARVN artillery fire missions are being processed through US artillery FADA's, integrating fires of adjacent units.

### f. Surveillance:

(1) Aerial Surveillance: An increase in allocation of surveillance aircraft (OIS) to IFFORCEV Arty from 9 to 17 during the reporting quarter has enabled a significant increase in the visual reconnaissance effort of Force artillery units. This increase resulted in increased target acquisitions and improved target surveillance.

(2) Ground Surveillance: A program of ground observation from within or near a firing battery position has been initiated

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in IFFORCEV Arty. The objective of the ground surveillance program is to watch for enemy movement and to obtain general battlefield intelligence. Well fortified observation posts are constructed from which observers are able to provide timely and accurate data on enemy firing positions during mortar or rocket attacks.

c. The 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175mm gun, self propelled) arrived in-country on 24 December 1967 and was attached to 52d Artillery Group effective 1 January 1968. 41st Artillery Group hosted the unit during their in-processing period. The battalion was assigned the mission of general support of the US/MNV/FRMAF in II CTZ on 15 January 1968. Battalion base camp was established at An Khe.

### h. Situation Report (SITREP):

(1) On 25 December 1967, I Field Force Vietnam artillery initiated a revised system for reporting artillery, naval gunfire and tactical air ammunition expenditures. The new SITREP provides more meaningful data regarding the manner in which fire support resources are being employed. All expenditures are now reported by target category as follows:

#### ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE

Confirmed  
Acquired  
Counterbattery  
Preparation  
Interdiction  
Special Purpose  
Others

#### TACTICAL AIR

Landing Zone Construction  
Landing Zone Preparation  
Preparatory Fires  
Close Air Support  
Convoy cover  
Known enemy locations  
Suspected enemy locations  
Interdiction missions

Support given to ARVN Forces is monitored on a monthly basis.

(2) The purpose of developing a more definitive report and analysis system is to provide a vehicle for channeling the efforts of all fire support agencies toward common objectives, which are: To direct firepower against the enemy so as to make the most efficient and coordinated use possible of integrated fire support resources and to obtain maximum utilization of all ordnance expended.

(3) Initial indications are that the system has begun to channel efforts of fire support agencies in the right direction and that it will provide an excellent management and evaluation tool by:

(a) Inducing a growing awareness of the requirement for expanded target acquisition efforts.

(b) Focusing attention on the need for coordinated integration of all fire support means.

(c) Illustrating the necessity for adherence to proper fire support procedures.

(d) Providing an accurate and definitive indication as to which elements are using fire support most effectively.

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(c) Aiding tactical commanders in their evaluation of specific firing units, naval gunfire resources and use of tactical air when redeployment or realignment of forces is being considered.

(4) This concept and basic system for reporting expenditures by target category was adopted by Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam. All Artillery units in South Vietnam began reporting under this format 1 February 1968.

i. Intelligence: The first IFFORCEV Arty Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) was dispatched on 6 January 1968. The INTSUM contains significant artillery intelligence reported by units attached to IFFORCEV Arty. Intelligence reported is consolidated by the IFFORCEV Arty S2 section and disseminated to IFFORCEV G2, 5th Special Forces Group and all artillery units including the Division artillery and separate brigades. Increased emphasis on artillery target intelligence is expected to result in more timely and accurate target acquisition and will increase the effectiveness of artillery fires.

## j. Training:

(1) To increase professionalism within the artillery and to insure a safe transition into combat operations for newly arrived personnel, two courses of instruction for IFFORCEV artillery and divisional Artillery units have been initiated beginning 8 January 1968.

(a) Forward Observer Training Course (FOTC): This course is conducted four times per month at 2d Bn, 17th Arty for a maximum of 12 students/class. FOTC consists of eight hours classroom instruction and 24 hours service practice and practical application. FOTC covers duties of the FO team, equipment, map reading, communication, mission of artillery, fire planning, rules of engagement, coordination and clearance of fire, Tac Air, Aerial Rocket Artillery, Naval support, night firing and lessons learned.

(b) Fire Direction Officer Training Course (FDOTC). This course is conducted four times per month at 3d Bn, 6th Arty for a maximum of 12 students/class. FDOTC covers organization of the FDC, duties of personnel, rules of engagement, coordination and clearance of fires, equipment, determination of chart data, friendly elements, computation of firing data, completion of forms, registrations, metro, VE, FADAC, deflection and fuse corrections, data for replot, high-angle fire, observed and surveyed firing charts, safety, extensive practical application and lessons learned.

(2) Operation of these courses is not expected to be a panacea but should prove a step forward in insuring the timely and accurate delivery of devastating artillery fires on the enemy. Continued and vigorous training at the lowest levels for all elements of the gunnery chain is still required to insure traditional artillery professionalism.

k. 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery (-) Departed II CTZ on 7 January 1968 and deployed to III CTZ with 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Battery D (Provisional), 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery remained in support of TF 3d Battalion, 50th Infantry in the Phan Thiet area.

l. On 7 January 1968, Battery A, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery was relieved from attachment with 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery and rejoined its parent battalion in I CTZ.

m. The 1st Cavalry Division (airmobile) Artillery (-) completed its move to I CTZ on 22 January 1968. The remaining Division Artillery units in II CTZ support the divisions 2d Brigade.

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n. 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (-) completed movement to I CTZ on 23 January 1968 when elements from battalion headquarters and Battery B joined Battery A in support of the 1st Cavalry (airmobile) in the Hue/Thu Bai area.

c. Statistics for US Artillery in II Corps Tactical Zone for the reporting quarter:

## (1) Missions fired:

	NOV	DEC	JAN
H&I	30618	33500	19984
OBSERVED	8327	10537	5750
UNOBSERVED	5393	4870	8894

## (2) Ammunition Expenditures

MONTH	CALIBER	AMMO EXPENDED	PERCENT OF TOTAL	ROUNDS/TUBE/DAY
NOV	105	0,095	72%	44
	155	75,111	19%	39
	8"	26,692	7%	28
	175	7,534	2%	4
Subtotal		389,472	100%	44*
DEC	105	230,148	73%	40
	155	54,606	17%	30
	8"	21,436	7%	27
	175	7,613	3%	3
Subtotal		313,803	100%	35*
JAN	105	168,277	65%	31
	155	52,496	21%	29
	8"	23,212	9%	31
	175	11,914	5%	14
Subtotal		255,899	100%	29*
Total		959,154	100%	36*

\*Integrated average.

p. Artillery Strength. The following table reflects artillery tube strength by caliber for US, ARVN and FRCF artillery units in II CTZ at the end of the quarter.

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CALIBER	<u>105mm</u>	<u>155mm</u>	<u>8 inch</u>	<u>175mm</u>
US Divisional	77	18	4	0
ARVN Divisional	108	36	0	0
US Force Artillery	72	34	20	28
ARVN Artillery	91	42	0	0
Special Forces	<u>18</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	366	130	24	28

g. US Artillery units of I Field Force Vietnam at the end of the reporting period were:

(1) Non-divisional.

I FFOCEV Artillery

5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105mm T)

6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (175/8 inch SP)

41st Artillery Group

7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm T)

Battery C, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (155mm T)

7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (175mm/8 inch SP)

Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm T)

2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (105mm T/155mm T Prov)

1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (-) (155mm T)

4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (ARVN SP)

Battery B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight)

Battery E, 41st Artillery (MG)

Headquarters Battery, 8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 26th Artillery

77th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

237th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

241st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

242d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

243d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

244th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

52d Artillery Group

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3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm SP)

6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175mm/8 inch SP)

5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175mm SP)

1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155mm T)

(2) Divisional.

4th Infantry Division Artillery

5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm/8 inch SP)

6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105mm T)

4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105mm T)

2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

1st Battalion, 77th Artillery (Controlling HQ only)

Battery C, 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery (105mm T)

Battery B, 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery (aka) (2.75m)

Battery A, 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery (105mm T)

Battery A, 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery (105mm T)

1st Brigade, 1st Airborne Division

Battery D (Provisional), 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery  
(105mm T)

173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)

3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (105mm T)

8. (C) Signal Operations.

a. Routine operations and upgrading of I FFOICeV communications continues to be the major activity of the Signal Section.

b. The 54th Signal Battalion provided communications support for Operations BOND, FLASHING, MCARTHUR, ALAMAH FALLS, and BOLLING.

c. On 21 Dec 67, Headquarters I Field Force published a communications Services Directory. This directory provides in one reference document useful locator and communications service information pertaining to advisor, COMUS, JOEFV Liaison and Special Forces units in the II Corps Tactical Zone. Many small groups and detachments are located throughout the II CTZ with whom it is possible to communicate but the means of communicating with them are little known. Since its publication there have been numerous requests for additional copies. This publication will be updated and expanded periodically.

d. In November, Typhoon Frieda moved through the II Corps area, causing some damage to communications equipment. Several antennae were damaged or destroyed at Vung Ro Mountain and Tuy Hoa. Restoration operations commenced as soon as high winds diminished sufficiently to permit personnel to work without undue risk. All communications were restored within approximately 24 hours.

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e. During this quarter major subordinate units have been fragmented, and I FFORCEV has extended communications to brigade and battalion size units. In addition, because of the lack of communications resources of smaller units, additional internal unit support has been provided from I FFORCEV resources. Thus far, these additional requirements have not proven unmanageable.

f. The 21st Signal Group began to parallel I FFORCEV Tactical systems with Army Area Communications systems, down to and including brigade size base camps. This effort relieves some of the burden placed on I FFORCEV tactical communications systems that had, by virtue of being the only means available in some areas, carried administrative and logistic circuits to non I FFORCEV combat service support units. As this concept becomes more fully implemented, I FFORCEV communications can be applied to strictly tactical command and control communications.

g. Programmed circuit requirements constituted a special item for study:

(1) The tactical situation often requires changes in plans during the planning phase. The planning for Operation HONOLULU (KLA-MATH FALLS) pointed up the difficulties encountered by this headquarters in attempting to program circuit requirements within the 30 day time frame desired by USARV and MACV. Planning started on 28 Aug 67. Between that time and D-Day, 1 Dec 67, numerous major changes were made in the task organization, the concept of operation and the time frame during which the operation would be conducted. For example major changes in the concept of the operation and in the task organization were made as late as 22 Nov and 26 Nov. The time parameters were again changed twice while the operation was in progress. This is a classic example of attempting to program communications support for a "planned" operation. In order to program circuits well in advance of an operation the planners must have firm knowledge of what the task organization is going to be, the area of operation involved, and the dates that the circuits will be required.

(2) Conversely, numerous unit redeployments are made with little or no prior notice in the II Corps Tactical Zone. This necessitates a rapid response by communications personnel at all levels. As long as the fluid tactical situation causes frequent changes in operations plans and results in short notice deployment of major troop units, a requirement to program circuits 30 days in advance is unrealistic. To date the Southeast Asia Wide Band System and MACV has responded extremely well to immediate requirements for emergency circuits. It is anticipated that this method of requesting circuits will, of necessity, continue to prevail for the foreseeable future.

### 9. (C) Engineer:

a. The majority of the effort of the engineer section during the reporting period was devoted to planning, coordination and supervision of the engineer combat support provided by the 18th Engineer Brigade units in support of I FFORCEV, 5th SFG, 10KRV and ARVN operations. The organic engineer units, 4th Engineer Battalion, 8th Engineer Battalion, Company A/326th Engineer Battalion and the 173rd Engineer Company, of the units under operational control of I FFORCEV were fully committed in support of their parent organizations throughout the period. Their activities were monitored by the engineer section. Tactical operations supported during the period were BOLLENG, BOLD, MCLAIN, MIZZLES, MCKATHUR, MCKSHIRC, SULTAN, KLA-MATH FALLS, ROSE,

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POWER HOUSE and FLORIDA. Specific engineer combat support effort expended by units of the 18th Engr Bde and divisional and brigade engineer units in support of current and future tactical operations are discussed in the following paragraphs.

b. Support of Tactical Operations:

(1) Operations AZZALI and LASHING. The 45th Engineer Group is in general support of these two operations. Support includes upgrading and maintenance of roads, repair of airfields and general engineer support.

(2) Operation KILATH FALLS. The 937th Engineer Group is in general support of this operation. Support included bridge construction, maintenance of roads and airfields and general support. During this period a considerable engineer effort was required to keep roads and airfields in the northwestern portion of the AO open as this area was the scene of large and heavy enemy contact. Routes 512, 511 and 509 were upgraded during this period.

(3) Operation KILATH FALLS. The 35th Engineer Group was in general support of Operation KILATH FALLS. Support included maintenance of roads and airfields, construction of FAH and FSA facilities, clearing base camp areas, application of dust palliatives and general engineer support.

c. Airfield Upgrading and/or Repair:

(1) Tan Alach airfield (IS 004597). The 20th Engr Bn began upgrading of this field from T-17 membrane to M&A matting on 24 Dec 67. When completed o/a 25 Feb 68, the field will be rated as Type II, C-130.

(2) Loi Klong airfield (Za 034932). The upgrading of this field from T-17 membrane to M&A matting commenced on 6 Nov 67 by the 70th Engr Bn. When completed o/a 20 Feb 68, it will be rated as Type II, C-130. The battalion also provided engineer support to Operation SULLAN at Loi Klong by constructing helicopter facilities, defensive emplacements and structures and by furnishing technical engineer assistance.

(3) Don Het CIG Camp and Airfield Complex (YLS65251). The 299th Engr Bn continued its construction efforts and during this period completed clearing the camp area, airfield site and areas surrounding the camp site with home flows completed construction of the Type II, C-7A airfield surfaced with M&A matting and initiated construction of the firebase complex adjacent to the CIG camp. The requirement to construct the airfield in such a manner that it could be expanded to a C-130 capability was rescinded by MACV. Current EEC of this project is 1 Feb 68.

(4) English airfield (KS 875013). The 19th Engr Bn commenced repairs to the middle 500 feet of the runway on 3 Nov 67. Repairs were completed on 24 Nov 67 and included removing the old M&A matting, removing the existing subgrade, placing a new subgrade consisting of crushed rock, overlaying it with T-17 membrane, placing a sand blanket over the membrane and finally laying down new M&A matting. Repairs to the parking apron are now in progress.

(5) Tieu Star airfield (ZV 022625). The 20th Engr Bn is furnishing engineer support to the 5th SFGA in support of Operation FLORIDA, which directs the construction of a CIG Camp and a Type II,

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C-7A airfield at Tieu Star. Commencing on 20 Dec 67, the 20th Engr Bn airlifted personnel, supplies and equipment into the site. Since this camp site is inaccessible by road, construction will be accomplished utilizing airmobile equipment from the 937th Engr Gp, 1st Cav Div and the 5th SFG. The present MOC is 1 Mar 68.

(6) Kontum airfield (MOC 790390). The construction of a second parking apron at Kontum airfield was completed by the 299th Engr Bn on 27 Nov 67. This second apron of H&L matting permits simultaneous unloading at both ends of the field.

(7) Lao Loc airfield (ZT 065796). The upgrading of Lao Loc from T-17 membrane to H&L matting was completed on 27 Nov 67 by the 14th Engr Bn. It is classed as a Type II, C-130 airfield. This field played a major role during Operation Khammoua Falls as a tactical and logistical base for the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. At the conclusion of this operation in Jan 68 the field had supported over 1000 C-130 sorties and difficulty was being encountered with cracks in the H&L matting and failure of walls.

(8) Dalat Cam Ly airfield (XZ 142001). The 87th Engr Bn commenced construction of a new 4500-ft runway, parallel to the existing runway at Dalat Cam Ly airfield on 17 Dec 67. This is an MCA project and has a current MOC of 30 Mar 68.

(9) Duc Lap airfield (YU906752). The planned upgrading of Duc Lap from T-17 membrane to H&L matting was postponed until next construction season in that area (commencing c/a Sep 68). This postponement was necessitated by the difficulties encountered in moving equipment and supplies out to Duc Lap. Major repairs to the T-17 runway and parking apron will be accomplished prior to the western monsoon season to permit use of this field by C-7A and C-123 aircraft during wet weather.

(10) T-17 Membrane Repairs: Platoon sized repair teams were employed on Ban Blich and Phu Nhon airfields for periods in excess of one week during this period, repairing failed factory seams, rips and tears in the T-17 membrane.

(11) Future Airfield Repair. The following fields are scheduled for repair or upgrading during the next three month period:

(a) Ban Nhon (ZV 032268): To be upgraded to Type II, C-130 capability. The 20th Engr Bn will accomplish this upon the completion of Tieu Star by extending the clear zones, enlarging the approach zones and by constructing a new five C-130 capable parking area.

(b) Chao Nho (HQ 233518). The old runway will be repaired to carry Type II, C-123 traffic. This project is to be a joint US-JVN project with JVN engineers repairing the failed sections of the new asphalt runway and reopening it to C-130 traffic.

(c) Dak To II (ZL C13-17). To be repaired with no change in present classification (Type II, C-130). The 299th Engr Bn is presently repairing Dak To I to carry Type II, C-7A traffic during the period Dak To II is being repaired.

(d) Dak Lek (XL 952683). To be repaired with no change in present classification (Type II, C-7A). The 299th Engr Bn will accomplish this through mechanical or chemical stabilization to alleviate present aircraft safety hazard caused by excessive loose surface stones on the runway.

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d. Land Clearing Operations. The 35th Land Clearing Team continued under O&CON of I FFOACV. During the past three months approximately 9,920 acres have been cleared along routes 19, 14, 60, 14B, 1, 512, and 191. The following routes have been cleared or are being cleared at present:

(1) Route 512: Cleared from 5 km west of Ban Hat east to junction with QL-14.

(2) QL-14: Cleared from junction with Rte 512 south to junction with Rte 60.

(3) QL-19: Cleared from I Luiku east to the An Khe Pass.

(4) Route 509: Organic dozers from the 937th Engr Gp cleared from I Luiku west to I Lei Ujeng.

(5) Route 14B: Cleared from junction with Rte 509 south to junction with Rte 191.

(6) Route 191: The 4th Engr Bn cleared from Duc Co east to junction with QL-14.

(7) Route 60: Cleared from I Lei Me northeast to junction with QL-14.

(8) QL-1 (II/III Corps boundary to Phan Thiet): Cleared by II FFOACV Home Flow Team during Dec 67.

(9) QL-1 (Phan Thiet - Phan Lang): Now being cleared by one Home Flow section with an EDC of 8 Feb 68. At present the section Phan Thiet to BN 6956 has been completed.

(10) QL-1 (Phan Lang - Ba Ngai): Organic dozers from the 14th Engr Bn commenced clearing along QL-1 during Dec 67. At present 300 acres to the north of Phan Lang have been cleared.

(11) Combat Trails: Organic dozers from the 4th Engr Bn cleared a dry weather road from Rte 191 (ZA 016509) north to Rte 509 (ZA 995415).

(12) QL-21: The Home Flow Section now clearing along QL-1, vic Phan Lang, will be moved to QL-21 o/a 15 Feb 68 and initiate land clearing operations along QL-21 (Minh Hoa - Ban Me Thuot).

(13) Route 7B: One of the Home Flow Sections now clearing vic Edap Enang will start clearing along Rte 7B o/a 10 Feb 68 from the junction of QL-14 and Rte 7B to Cheo Khe.

e. Route Upgrading. The I FFOACV objective has been to open roads first to QL-18 to permit movement of troops and supplies, then improve to QL-31 to permit movement of gasoline tankers and self propelled artillery and finally to upgrade to MACV standard, which is an all-weather, 24 ft wide roadway with permanent bridges of QL-35, two-way and QL-50, one-way.

(1) QL-1: Cu Mong Pass (Ch 0313) to Tuy An (CQ 1069) initiated joint US-VN upgrading from QL-18 to QL-31, two-lane, all-weather.

(2) QL-1: II/III CTZ boundary (AN 1801) to Phan Lang (BN 7786) upgraded from closed to QL-18, all-weather.

(3) QL-1: Tuy Hoa (CQ 1548) to Vung Ko (CQ 2722) initiated upgrading from QL-31 towards MACV standards.

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(4) L-11: Phan Rang (LN 8077) to Dilat (LN 2521) initiated upgrading to CL-31 to include widening the curves and culverts of the switchbacks leading up to Dilat. Convoy passage time has been reduced by two hours in work accomplished prior to 18 Jan 68.

(5) CL-20: Lao Loc (ZT 6679) to II/I Corps boundary (YT 7656) upgraded from CL-12, fair weather to CL-12 all-weather by joint US-VN-US effort.

(6) CL-21: Ninh Hoa (LN 9861) to Lan Ma Thuy (AQ 8004) completed joint US-VN effort to reopen route to CL-50 one-way limited all-weather status.

(7) Rte 509: Leiku (LN 4775) to Loi Djereng (YA 8646) upgraded from CL-12, fair-weather to CL-50, limited all-weather status.

(8) Rte 63 and 24: Junction of TL-1 and Rte 61 (CQ 0771) to Dong Tre (LC 9171) reopened to CL-31, all-weather status.

(9) Rte 512: Dak To (ZL 0422) to Ben Het (YL 8725) from closed to CL-50, limited all-weather status.

(10) Rte 511: Kontum (ZA 2289) to Loi Kleng (ZA 0393) from closed to CL-45, limited all-weather status.

(11) TL-3A: Ban Son (LN 8693) to Hay Tay (LN 8083) upgraded from CL-20, fair-weather to CL-31, limited all-weather capability.

(12) TL-3A: Binh Khe (LN 6247) to Vinh Thanh (LN 6240) upgraded from CL-31, fair weather to CL-31, limited all-weather capability.

f. Paving Operations. Paving and upgrading to MACV standards was completed on QL-19 from La Gi to An Khe, on QL-14 from the northern limits of Fleiku south to the entrance to Camp Enari, on QL-19 east from Leiku to Camp Holloway and on QL-1 from Qui Nhon to Phu My (LN 9067).

### g. 18th Engineer Brigade Support Within III M.F.

(1) The 39th Engr Bn (45th Engr Gp) remained under the operational control of the AMMACAL Division until 20 Jan 68, when OPCON was returned to the 18th Engr Bde.

(2) The 45th Engr Gp assumed the additional responsibility for maintaining and upgrading CL-1 from Duc rho to Chu Lai commencing on 20 Jan 68.

(3) The 18th Engr Bde deactivated the 554th Float Bridge Co on 14 Dec 67 to provide assets for the formation of Co E (Float Bridge Co) of the recently activated 26th Engr Bn (AMMACAL Div). The loss of this unit left I FFCACEV with only one non-divisional float bridge unit, the 553rd FB Co, which was split up to provide each of the three groups with one FB platoon.

### h. Miscellaneous Projects.

(1) Dien Khanh Bridge (LN 939557). The 800 ft timber pile bent bridge at Dien Khanh was partially destroyed by high waters on 30 Nov 67. On 1 Dec 67 the 864th Engr Bn initiated repairs which consisted of replacing the entire superstructure. Repairs were completed on 4 Dec utilizing 24 hr/day operations.

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(2) Phu Yen Aqueduct (CI 007353). On 28 Nov 67 an artillery round struck one bank of the aqueduct causing about 18,000 cu yds of aqueduct embankment to slide away before the water could be diverted. The Vietnamese Irrigation Service requested US assistance in accomplishing repairs on the aqueduct; therefore, commencing on 1 Feb 68 the 577th Engr Bn will improve roads, install a M4T6 ferry and furnish and replace approximately 800 tons of blast rock to form the toe of the berm and prevent erosion by the river. The remainder of the work will be accomplished by Irrigation Service with assistance from the RVN engineers.

(3) Phu Cat Training Center. The 45th Engr Gp has been supporting the renovation of the training center by furnishing engineer equipment and technical assistance.

(4) PAC pavements. A total of 54 pavements for F4C aircraft were constructed during this period at Dragon Mtn, Two Hits, Dak To, Oasis, Kontum, An Khe, Phan Thiet, Plei Ujereng, Duc Co, Lan Me Thuot (City), Chao Koo, Plei Mo, Plei Tan Gi, Phu Kiep, Dong La Thin and Qui Nhon.

(5) Power Plant Conduit Rupture (CI 4609). On 29 Nov 67 the two penstocks leading from Ho Lon Luong Reservoir to the power plant near Dalet ruptured releasing a wave of water which inundated the power plant and washed out six sections of QL-11 approximately 50M wide and up to 30 M deep. Repairs were commenced on 3 Dec 67 as the 610th Const Spt Co assisted by a platoon from the 14th Engr Bn started to repair the west end of the washed out section while the 87th Engr Bn initiated repairs on the east end. Repairs were difficult to accomplish as the cuts were down to bedrock and inclined at an angle of 45 to 60 degrees. This portion of QL-11 was reopened to traffic on 10 Dec 67.

(6) Dak To AS (ZI 013217). The 299th Engr Bn commenced construction of a new 20 pad AS adjacent to Dak To II Airfield on 14 Nov 67. The AS was completed on 19 Jan 68.

10 (U) Information Office.

a. Representatives of the Information Office provided publicity coverage for numerous award and promotion ceremonies as well as for special events during this period, including:

(1) Arrival of Major General Keith L. Ware, assigned as Deputy Commanding General, I FFOCEV, 7 December 1967.

(2) Presentation of the Legion of Merit to Brigadier General James G. Kallergis, CG, I FFOCEV Artillery, by Lieutenant General William B. Rosson, 6 January 1968.

(3) Presentation of the Meritorious Unit Commendation to Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I FFOCEV Artillery, by Lieutenant General William B. Rosson, 6 January 1968.

(4) Arrival of Major General William R. Fears, assigned as Deputy Commanding General, I FFOCEV, 20 January 1968.

b. Photographic coverage was provided for the visits of numerous distinguished visitors, including:

(1) General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, US Army, 25 December 1967.

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(2) Sergeant Major of the Army William O. Woolridge, 25 December 1967.

(3) Chaplain (Major General) Francis L. Sampson, Chief of Chaplains, US Army, 27 December 1967.

(4) Brigadier General Wendell J. Coats, Chief of Information, US Army, 27 December 1967.

c. The following media representatives were granted an interview with the commanding general and/or a G2/G3 briefing during the period covered by the report:

(1) Mr. Chris Lydon, Boston Globe, and Miss Maude Dorr, New York Village Voice, 2 November 1967.

(2) Mr. Robert Kaylor, UPI, 3 November 1967.

(3) Mr. Stan Carter, Washington Bureau Chief and Military Analyst, New York Daily News, 24 November 1967.

(4) Mr. Charles W. Bailey, White House Correspondent, Minneapolis Tribune, and Mr. Ronald H. Ross, Far East Correspondent, Minneapolis Tribune, 29 November 1967.

(5) Mr. Wendell Merick, Bureau Chief, US News and World Report, 4 December 1967.

(6) Mr. John Donnelly, Newsweek Magazine, 14 December 1967.

(7) Miss Elizabeth Pond, Christian Science Monitor, 16 December 1967.

(8) Dr. Waldo Stephens, news commentator and analyst, KMTV, Oklahoma City, 30 December 1967.

(9) Mr. Don Obendorfer, Washington Correspondent, Knight Papers, 18 January 1968.

d. The 5th Public Information Detachment, under the supervision of the IO, IFFORCEV, published and distributed its "Morning News" on a daily basis, and published the November, December and January issues of the IFFORCEV magazine, the "Typhoon".

e. The 11th Public Information Detachment continued to provide transportation, escort, billets and other aid to correspondents and visiting information personnel, handling 918 personnel during the period covered. A major renovation project on the Press Camp in Nha Trang was completed, vastly improving the facilities available for correspondents. The Pleiku Press Camp moved into its permanent buildings and work is continuing to improve the facilities.

#### 11. (U) Inspector General Activities:

a. Colonel Gordon D. Rood arrived on 11 Dec 67 and assumed the duties of Inspector General, this headquarters. Colonel Rood was previously assigned to the United States Army Materiel Command where he served as the Liaison Officer for the United States Army Air Defense Command.

b. During the period 10 complaints and 24 requests for assistance were received. Four of the complaints were justified, but none of the complaints indicated any evidence of trends, widespread irregularities or problems detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of this command.

c. Command inspections of the following units were conducted during the period on the dates indicated:

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Unit	Date
41st Civil Affairs Co	17 Nov 67
11th Public Information Det	
55th Military Intelligence Det	22 Nov
64th Engineer Det	
Headquarters Company, I Field Force Vietnam	15 Dec 67
272d Military Police Co	22 Dec 67
297th Transportation Co (CAR)	29 Dec 67
54th Signal Battalion	
209th Signal Detachment	19 Jan 68

(1) All units inspected were rated as Satisfactory and were found to be accomplishing their mission in an efficient and economical manner.

(2) The 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery was inspected by USAFV during the period 2 - 6 Jan 68. The unit (commanded by LTC John G. Kloke) was given a personal commendation by the Deputy Commanding General, USAFV for an outstanding performance of duty.

d. During the period, two investigations were conducted by the Inspector General.

e. The Inspector General maintained liaison with the Acting Inspectors General of units assigned/attached to this headquarters. Act-  
int Inspector General positions vacated due to DEROS, reassignment, etc., were filled as indicated below:

(1) Major Jinnie L. Glisson	7th Bn, 13th Arty
(2) Major Raymond E. Gatti	7th Bn, 15th Arty
(3) Major Elbert L. Maxwell	2d Bn, 17th Arty
(4) Major Omar J. Calciolari	5th Bn, 27th Arty
(5) Major Warren E. Brown	1st Bn, 30th Arty
(6) Major James J. Scalise	6th Bn, 32d Arty
(7) Major Richard E. Favaliski	4th Bn, 60th Arty
(8) Major Norral L. Barnes	HQ, 41st Arty Gp

f. Two staff visits were conducted as indicated below:

(1) On 25 - 27 Dec 67 the IG visited HQ, 41st Arty Gp and the 1st Bn, 30th Arty to discuss the USAFV Annual General Inspection which was conducted on 2 - 6 Jan 68.

(2) 15 - 16 Jan 68 the IG visited the HQ 52d Arty Gp, 1st Bde/4th Inf Div, II Corps, and the 4th Inf Div IG for the purpose of staff liaison.

## 12. (U) Staff Advocate Activities:

a. There were eight trials by general courts-martial convened by the Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, during the quarter compared to three the previous quarter. The offenses involved in all the cases were military type offense. Eighty-seven special and 38 summary

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1968 LCS CSFOR-65 UIC WDD LHM HQ IFFORCEV (U)

courts-martial records of trial were reviewed for legal sufficiency. This reflects an increase of 36 special and six summary courts-martial cases over the previous quarter.

b. Thirteen claims of Army personnel for loss of, or damage to, personal property incident to service were adjusted and paid, compared to 16 the previous quarter. The claims totalling \$1358.07 were approved for payment in the total amount of \$1158.21.

c. The legal assistance office provided advice and assistance on civil matters to 828 individuals during the quarter compared to 768 the previous quarter.

d. No significant problems were encountered during the quarter in the judge advocate functional areas of responsibility.

## SECTION II - COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### PART I - OBSERVATIONS

a. Item. Installation of Army Area Communication System Circuits.  
Discussion: During combat operations it is highly desirable to keep the communications systems installed by Field Force Signal units free for command and control circuits. To accomplish this it is necessary for the Field Force Signal Officer to undertake direct coordination with Army Area Communications System Personnel, to accommodate administrative and logistic support elements present in forward areas.  
Observation: When possible, Army Area Systems to the tactical units should be installed simultaneously with Field Force command and control systems. Ideally this action will result in freeing the Field Force system from the initial burden of providing administrative and logistic circuits and will make them more available and responsive to the needs of command.

### b. Item. Agavenco Spray System

Discussion: Two 200 gallon capacity, Agavenco Spray Systems were received by DSA, II Corps in January 68. One sprayer has been loaned to the 4th Infantry Division and the other to the 173d Airborne Brigade. The sprayers, mounted in UH-1 Helicopters, are being used to attack rice seedling beds in approved herbicide areas and for perimeter defoliation. There are certain precautions which must be observed when using the Agavenco:

(1) The helicopters must fly at speeds in excess of 50 knots to activate the system and to provide enough pressure to dispense the herbicide properly.

(2) The sprayer must be turned off while the helicopter banks in order to prevent herbicide from spraying against the sides of the aircraft. Herbicide is harmful to paint.

(3) The spray system should be mounted after the helicopter has been fully fueled, since the spray boom on the right side must be removed to allow refueling.

(4) A filter should be placed over the mouth of the intake tube to prevent sludge from being drawn into the spray tank.

Observations: Proper utilization of the Agavenco sprayers in a crop destruction role could maintain great pressure on the enemy's food resources. Operators and pilots must be familiar with precautions to be observed while spraying.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1968 ACS G300-65 CIG WMLM HQ 1FFDACEV (U)

c. Item: Targeting of Interdiction Fires.

Discussion: Targeting of interdiction fires has not always made the best use of current intelligence. Interdiction fires have sometimes been planned based on intuition and experience, on trails, stream junction, etc, instead of on areas where there is a high probability of enemy presence. The fragmentation of artillery units has also contributed to the situation, as more and more interdiction fire planning is done at lower echelons which do not have rapid access to intelligence agencies. Intelligence available to targeting agencies at all levels has tended to be too stale for targeting purposes.

Observation: Division and Corps-Level FSCE's have the personnel and the resources to overcome these shortcomings. It is necessary to establish a direct channel of communication between the FSCE/FSCE and the G2 to insure current intelligence in the form of prisoner interrogation, agent, aerial and ground reconnaissance reports is made available for targeting use while it is still valid. By targeting on a daily basis and utilizing the most current intelligence available, the FSCE/FSCE can produce interdiction programs which do not waste artillery ammunition and which will result in a higher probability of inflicting significant damage on the enemy.

d. Item: Targeting of B52 strikes.

Discussion: Targeting for B52 strikes has been accomplished many times without as complete an analysis as desired. B52 targets should meet the following criteria:

- (1) The target must be of sufficient importance to warrant the expenditure of great amounts of ordnance.
- (2) It must be a target that will remain in position long enough to allow complete coordination of the strike.

Observation: Effective targeting requires that all intelligence be screened and analyzed to determine if the area under study meets the above criteria. In addition to the location, nature, size and shape of the target, the following information must be determined:

- (1) Vulnerability of the target i.e. bunkers with overhead cover, foxholes, etc.
- (2) Capability: Does target pose a major threat to friendly troops? Does the target have the capability of moving rapidly?
- (3) Recuperability: Can target recuperate soon after the strike to pose a continued threat to friendly troops?
- (4) Terrain: Hilly, flat or heavily wooded terrain will affect the level of damage that can be accomplished.
- (5) Proximity to friendly troops, religious monuments, national shrines or friendly civilians must be considered.

After considering all the above, the target box must be planned to inflict maximum damage on the enemy while holding the level of risk to all friendly personnel and installations at a minimum. Once a target is chosen it must be updated continually to determine continuing validity. With proper analysis and targeting techniques the B52 strike can yield better results.

e. Item: Logistical resupply to advisory teams in areas not readily accessible by land LOC.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period I ending  
31 January 1968 US 33FOA-65 LIG MULLIN HQ AFPOHCEV (U)

DISCUSSION: Resupply of advisory teams in inaccessible areas can prove challenging especially when all military common user aircraft are engaged in other priority tactical or logistical airlift. Three choices exist in resupplying these inaccessible areas which rate a lower priority of response. In order of general merit, they are:

(1) Efficient scheduling of dedicated aircraft, such as C7A's, which are made available to Field Force Headquarters. Thus many users are satisfied more efficiently and within their relative priorities.

(2) Use of space available aboard Air America aircraft. The cooperation of the COMUS staff opens this possibility.

(3) Use of US Army aircraft for resupply. This method should be employed only in an emergency because these aircraft are in demand for urgent support of combat troops or their required maintenance services.

OBSERVATION: Whenever possible the Field Force Headquarters should have seven to ten dedicated C7A aircraft allocated daily for retail movement of urgent passengers and cargo. In addition, proper coordination should be maintained between G4 and COMUS for efficient interchange between US military airlift and Air America of large and small cargo shipment capabilities.

f. Item: Employment and manning of clearing stations.

Discussion: The necessity for utilizing clearing stations rather than relying on direct evacuation to the hospital when units are operating at the extended distances encountered in II Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) was demonstrated during the heavy fighting in the Dak To area during November 1967. Even if aircraft had been available to fly the patients directly to the hospital some of them would no doubt have died during the trip, whereas none of the 929 wounded in action who were admitted to the clearing stations of the 173d Abn Bde and the 4th Inf Div at Dak To during the month of November died either in the clearing stations or enroute to the hospital. Several factors felt to have contributed to this success are:

(1) Skilled personnel. Each of the clearing stations had a medical officer with approximately three years of residency in a surgical specialty.

(2) Whole blood. Approximately 175 units of blood\* were given by the two clearing stations during the month.

(3) Availability of X-ray. X-rays done on several patients with chest wounds resulted in the use of chest tubes when the clinical picture did not adequately indicate the extent of the hemo- or pneumothorax. The surgeons felt that some of these patients would have developed respiratory difficulty during evacuation had the drainage not been established.

Observation: Air evacuation has not made the clearing station obsolete. Clearing stations with well trained personnel and adequate equipment provide a life saving link in the evacuation chain in II CTZ. Medical companies of combat units operating in areas away from the immediate vicinity of a hospital should be manned with at least one experienced surgeon and be equipped with X-ray facilities satisfactory for making chest films.

\* Morbidity reports, 4th Inf Div & 173d Abn Bde, November 1967

\*\* USARV Monthly Blood Bank Report, November 1967

g. Item: Augmentation of division medical service.

Discussion: During January 1968 two occasions arose in which help had to be requested from the 44th Med Lde elements to provide division level medical service for I FFPOHCEV combat units.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1968 HQ: CSFOR-65 UAC HULL HQ IFFORCEV (U)

(1) At Phan Thiet TF 2/7, a reinforced battalion, had been supported by an entire medical company of the 15th Medical Battalion. Changes in distribution of troops made it desirable to utilize this company more fully in support of a brigade instead of the smaller task force. The 43d Medical Group of the 44th Med Bde responded to a request for help with a clearing element.

(2) The area of operations of the 4th Inf Division became extended to the point that clearing stations had to be split to provide division level support to those units deployed at the extended distance. Because of the limited manning that the division medical service was working under in compliance with a USARV message (unclassified AVHSU 64171, 280049Z Sep 67, Subject: Medical Service) it was found that the split clearing stations could not be adequately supported, therefore assistance was asked of the 43d Med Gp, 44th Med Bde. A clearing element was placed at Ban Hu Thuot by the 43d Med Gp.

Observation: Medical elements organic to combat units are not manned or equipped to support the multiple units deployed over the extended distance that have been encountered in II CTZ. Army level medical resources should be kept available to supplement the medical elements of combat units when they become overextended.

h. Item: Medical civic action programs (MEDCAP).

Discussion: Emphasis should be placed on the integration of US medical civic action program (MEDCAP's) with Vietnamese health efforts. The manner in which restraint and proper channeling and coordination of MEDCAP efforts can contribute to the long term improvement of the Vietnamese health care was demonstrated during an outbreak of plague in November in the An Nhon Subsector of Binh Dinh Province. The initial reaction to the outbreak was for the U.S. Military units to rush in and quickly institute control and treatment measures, but tempering this effort and coordinating it with the province and district health resources resulted in the outbreak being an excellent training vehicle for Vietnamese health workers and for the villagers. The key coordinator in this case was the USAID/COMUS Assistant Health Officer, Region II. Similar results can be obtained at the province level, if care is taken by U.S. Military units to insure that the medical assistance they wish to render in a community is coordinated through and used to supplement the existing Vietnamese health system. This system does have more potential than is frequently realized.

Observation: Although it may be easier and more efficient for U.S. military units to handle epidemics and other disease problems than it is for them to coordinate with and assist the responsible Vietnamese health workers, the latter course offers more for the long-term upgrading of Vietnamese health care. MEDCAPS and other medical assistance programs should be geared to training and augmentation whenever possible rather than to treatment by U.S. personnel.

1. Item: Operation of helicopters in the immediate vicinity of airfields surfaced with T-17 membrane or MX-19 matting.

Discussion: The operation of helicopters, especially the CH-47 and CH-53, immediately adjacent to an airfield surfaced with MX-19 or over one surfaced with T-17 membrane presents a definite hazard to the field's operational capability as the upwash from the helicopters will tend to lift the surfacing material and to carry it along with the helicopter for a short distance. This results in a displacement of the runway alignment, wrinkles in the matting, failure of the anchorage system and possible ripping of T-17 membrane seams. The T-17 membrane field at Duc Lap was recently damaged by a CH-47 that took off from the parking apron. Its rotor wash lifted up a large number of the anchorage stakes, thereby rendering this portion of the apron unusable. At Plei Djereng a CH-47 lifted up an entire section of the MX-19 runway causing a major displacement in the runway's alignment. This incident is mainly attributable

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1969 MCS CSFOL-65 UIC 110000 H2 IFFO:CLV (U)

to insufficient anchoring of the MX-19 to the subgrade, thereby allowing the rotor-wash to get under the matting causing the matting to lift up.

Observation: Large helicopters; such as CH-47 and CH-54, should be landed away from T-17 and MX-19 airfields and should avoid, if at all possible, hovering at low altitudes near the runway or parking apron. Anchorage systems for MX-19 must secure the matting firmly to the subgrade and be of sufficient strength to withstand the lifting effects of low flying helicopters.

j. Item: Use of culverts in place of bridges along insecure routes or in areas where enemy incidents are frequent.

Discussion: Use of culverts in these situations is desirable as culverts are simple to construct, easy to repair, difficult and costly to destroy and built using noncritical materials and equipment. A certain risk must be expected in areas of heavy run-off as washouts may occur during the monsoon season.

Observation: The use of culverts whenever feasible will result in an overall saving of engineer resources.

k. Item: Current references concerning bunker or shelter design.

Discussion: The current field manual on bunker or shelter design, FM 5-15, Field Fortification, Feb 65 does not contain adequate material to meet combat requirements as it does not provide data on the method to design a specific sized bunker to withstand the effects of a specific weapon. Each unit within II CTZ designs bunkers based upon its own design concepts, whereas the best design is often not selected or considered. A testing program should be conducted to determine what designs should be employed and a publication covering them distributed. Standard designs should consider commonly used bunker sizes; such as the four man fighting bunker (8' x 16' x 6'-6"); company Gr bunker (16' x 16' x 6'-6"); battalion Gr bunker (16' x 24' x 6'-6") and the brigade or division TOC (16' x 46' x 6'-6"). Commonly used designs in II CTZ are based upon providing protection from 62 mm mortar, 120 mm and 140 mm rocket and 105 arty.

Observation: A manual or publication is immediately needed to provide a standard method of designing both above and below ground protective bunkers, to furnish design data and to provide effective bunker designs based upon defense against specific weapons.

l. Item: M8A1 matting failures under heavy usage.

Discussion: The failure of M8A1 matting from heavy usage by air craft supporting a brigade base was observed at Bao Loc Airfield during Operation KHAMTH FALIS. This airfield was completed on 20 Nov 67 just prior to the start of this operation and was in excellent condition. At the conclusion of the operation on 15 Jan 68 the field had received over 1000 C-130 sorties and two points of weakness had developed in the M8A1 matting. First, the welds cracked on either side of the cover plate allowing the connecting pins to come loose and the ends of the matting to turn up. Over 15% of the matting planks sustained at least one failure of this type. Secondly, heavier duty locking lugs are needed as numerous problems were encountered due to locking lug failure which allowed the matting to shift and become disengaged from the adjacent piece. It is suspected that these failures may be attributable to the effects of a C-130's impact during touch-down, landing and prop reversal. This impact may cause each panel to expand minutely, thereby causing the M8A1 matting to roll up in front of the C-130. This rolling effect may exert sufficient stress on the welds to cause them to fail. These failures forced the engineers supporting this tactical operation to devote

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1968 ACS CSFOR-65 UIC WOODMAN HQ IFFORCEV (U)

a portion of their resources in performing constant maintenance on the matting by welding the matting each night in preparation for the next day's traffic.

Observation: Reinforcement or redesign of connecting pin cover plates or locking lugs would greatly increase the life span of the M8A1 matting and reduce the welding maintenance required. The use of expansion panels at specific distances along the runway would reduce or eliminate the rolling effect and the effects of temperature on the matting, thereby reducing the stress on the welds.

PART II (C) - RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That a comprehensive design manual be prepared and distributed to furnish design criteria for the type of protective bunkers required in Vietnam.

b. That an engineering study be instituted to determine what improvements can be made to M8A1 matting to reduce its maintenance requirements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

17 Incl  
as

*George S. Blanchard*  
GEORGE S. BLANCHARD  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - DA, ACSFOR
- 2 - CINCSAMPAC
- 6 - USARV
- 1 - CG, II FFORCEV
- 1 - CG, 4th Inf Div
- 1 - CG, 173d Abn Bde
- 1 - CG, I FFORCEV Arty
- 1 - DSA, II Corps
- 1 - ACoFS, G1
- 1 - ACoFS, G2
- 5 - ACoFS, G3
- 1 - ACoFS, G4
- 1 - US Army War College, ATTN: Library Q-2149
- 1 - Comdt, USA C&GSC, Ft Leavenworth
- 1 - 13th Mil Hist Det
- 1 - COMUS

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Incl

- |                                       |   |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| 1. Location of Enemy Forces, II Corps | *12. I FFORCEV KEY PERSONNEL            |
| *2. <del>AG-ELSD</del>                | 19. I FFORCEV Strength                  |
| *3. <del>AG-MCLAIN</del>              | 14. Enlisted Promotion Allocations      |
| *4. <del>AG-PERSHING</del>            | 15. R&R Statistics                      |
| *5. <del>AG-POLLING</del>             | *16. <del>Awards</del>                  |
| *6. <del>AG-MACARTHUR</del>           | 17. Military Disabling Injuries by Unit |
| 7. I FFORCEV Task Organization        |   |
| 8. I FFORCEV Organizational Structure |   |
| *9. <del>Psych Leaflet</del>          |   |
| *10. <del>Psych Leaflet</del>         |   |
| *11. <del>Psych Leaflet</del>         |   |

\*Denotes: Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

**SECRET**

AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 68) 1st Ind (C)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 UIC WDDLAA HQ I FFORCEV (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 28 FEB 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons  
Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters,  
I Field Force Vietnam (DDLA).

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning bunker or shelter design, page 57,  
paragraph k, section II, part I; and page 58, paragraph a, section II, part II.  
Tests are being conducted by a number of agencies [e.g., Combined Materiel  
Exploitation Center (CMEC) and III MAF] to determine the effects of typical  
VC/NVA weapons against prototype bunkers. To date, results are incom-  
plete. In practice, bunkers are designed to utilize locally available materials  
and their construction is dependent upon the tactical requirements. A typi-  
cal design is capable of protecting the occupants from the burst of a mortar  
or light artillery shell impacting 15 meters from the position.

b. Reference item concerning M8A1 matting failures under heavy  
usage, page 57, paragraph l, section II, part I; and page 58, paragraph b,  
section II, part II. The design loading for M8A1 matting is 200 applications of  
a 25,000 pound single wheel load, or the equivalent of 200 C-130 takeoffs or  
landings. One thousand sorties is equal to two thousand loadings, thereby ex-  
ceeding the design stress by a factor of ten in less than two months for the  
case in question. Failure of the matting under these conditions must be ex-  
pected, and extensive maintenance is required to keep the airfield operational  
under unusual traffic conditions.

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*Downgraded at 9 year intervals  
Declassified after 12 years  
DOD DIF 5209.10*

UPGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL WHEN SEPARATED  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

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AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 68)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 UIC WDDLAA HQ I FFORCEV (U)

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*C. S. Nakatsukasa*  
C. S. NAKATSUKASA  
Captain, USAF  
AFSC 10-10-10-10-10

Copy furnished:  
HQ I FFORCEV

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**SECRET**


61  
GPOP-DT (15 Feb 63) 2d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, I Field Force  
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 Jan 63,  
RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96358 5 AFZ 723


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,  
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and  
forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as  
indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
K. F. OSEGUEN  
MAJ, AGC  
Act AG

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**Inc. 1**

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E Co, 20th Inf (L&P)  
54th Inf Det (Radar)  
68th Inf Det (Radar)  
43d AFU (APO 94350)  
54th Sig Bn (Corps)  
55th MI Det  
64th Eng. Det (Terrain)  
209th Sig Det (K&L)  
272d MP Co (Corps)  
277th Trans Co (GAR)

USARV GO 4916, 26 Sep 67  
USARV GO 3137, 27 May 66  
USARV GO 1913, 28 Mar 66  
USARV GO 5953, 6 Oct 66  
USARV GO 668, 20 Sep 65  
USARV GO 1229, 27 Oct 65  
USARV GO 159, 13 Jan 66  
USARV GO 1590, 15 Nov 65  
USARV GO 668, 20 Sep 65  
USARV GO 5953, 6 Oct 66

USARV GO 5271, 14 Oct 67  
IFFORCEV GO 200, 9 Jun 66  
IFFORCEV GO 415, 25 Oct 66

TRFFORCEV GO 25, 16 Nov 65

PKU  
AKS  
NHA  
NHA  
NHA  
NHA  
NHA  
NHA  
NHA

NOTE: \* Unit is in support of units OPCON to III MAF.

## ATTACHED UNITS

5th PI Det  
11th PI Det  
13th MI Hist Det  
26th CHL Det (CHL CTR)  
41st CA Co (-)  
184th CHL Plt (DS)  
191st MI Det  
303th IR Bn

## AUTHORITY

USARV GO 5587, 8 Sep 66  
USARV GO 4878, 21 Jul 66  
USARV GO 2181, 28 Dec 65  
USARV GO 1056, 16 Oct 65  
USARV GO 4079, 22 Jun 66  
USARV GO 1056, 16 Oct 65  
USARV GO 1056, 16 Oct 65  
509th IM Gp GO 9, 8 Jun 66

## STATUS

Attached 1st Cav Div (AH)  
Attached 1st Cav Div (AH)  
Attached 1st Cav Div (AH)

## AUTHORITY

IFFORCEV GO 16, 25 Oct 65  
IFFORCEV GO 16, 25 Oct 65  
IFFORCEV GO 16, 25 Oct 65

LOC  
NHA  
NHA  
NHA  
NHA  
NHA  
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# CONFIDENTIAL

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HEADQUARTERS I FORCEV EASY ORGANIZATION

OPCON UNITS

14th Inf Div (-)

173d Abn Bde

2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)

II Corps US Army Advisory Op

17th Combat Aviation Op

7th Armd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav

3d Bn, 506th Inf (1st Bde, 101st Abn Div)

8th Psyops Bn

Co B, 5th SFG

201st Avn Co

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

INCL 7

AUTHORITY

USARV OPLAN 78-55 (OP ROBIN)

MACV msg (S) MACC011 16892, 231133Z  
May 67, Reinforcement of II CTZ (U)

MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 29 Mar 66 MACV msg  
(S) MACC011 01625, 151228Z Jan 68,  
Unit Deployment (U)

MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 29 Mar 66 paragraph 5(3)

MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 29 Mar 65 Task Organization

U ARV msg (G) AVHOC-O 31527 11086Z Jan 68,  
Assignment Status of 201st Avn Co (Corps) and  
7/17th Air Cav Sqdn (U)

MACV msg (S) MACC011 01603, 151110Z Jan 68,  
Byrd AO (U)

MACV ltr (PDUO) MACPD dtd 6 Dec 66, Employment  
of the US Army 6th Psyops Battalion (Tactical)

MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 29 Mar 66 paragraph 5(4)  
MACV msg (S) MACC012 02513, 211235Z Jan 67,  
OPCON of USASF Teams in II CTZ (U)

USARV msg (G) AVHOC-O 31527, 110816Z Jan 68,  
Assignment Status of 201st Avn Co (Corps)  
and 7/17th Air Cav Sqdn (U)

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LO2

PKU

AKS

PNU

PKU

NHA

PKU

PHF

NHA

PAU

NHA

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## AVIATION SUPPORT

NAV LETTER MACCOK, DATED 13 JUNE 1967, SUBJECT: ARMY AVIATION ALLOCATION (U) PLACES THE FOLLOWING ALLOCATIONS CURRENTLY UNDER CONTROL OF THE 17TH AVIATION GROUP IN SUPPORT OF HEADQUARTERS I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM.

### 10th Cbt Avn Bn

61st Avn Co (AML)  
92d Avn Co (AML)  
189th Avn Co (MED HEL)  
213d Avn Co (MED HEL)  
281st Avn Co (AML)

### 223d Cbt Spt Avn Bn

18th Avn Co (SIG)  
183d Avn Co (SIG)  
165th Avn Co (SIG)  
203d Avn Co (SIG)  
219th Avn Co (SIG)  
225th Avn Co (SIG)

### 52d Cbt Avn Bn


57th Avn Co (AML)  
119th Avn Co (AML)  
155th Avn Co (AML)  
170th Avn Co (AML)  
179th Avn Co (MED HEL)  
189th Avn Co (AML)

### 268th Cbt Avn Bn

18th Avn Co (AML)  
129th Avn Co (AML)  
134th Avn Co (-) (AML)  
192d Avn Co (AML)  
196th Avn Co (MED HEL)  
330th Avn Co (AML)

# CONFIDENTIAL

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INCL (COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS)

INCL - 8

1 Nov 1967 - 31 Jan 1968

UNIT	AS OF 31 Jan 1968 AUTH	\$ PDY/AUTH	KIA	BATTLE WIA	MIA
HQ I FFORCEV(1)	489	103.5			
I FFORCEV(2)	1298	99.3			
52d Arty Gp(3)	2329	94.7		1	1
41st Arty Gp(4)	3667	103.0	2	38	
51st Sig Bn(5)	1020	101.7	1		
41st CA Co	140	84.2			
55th MI Det	83	91.5			
272d MP Co	182	116.4	2	5	
1st Cav Div (AM)	17106	91.4	82	864	22
1st Cav Atch	1218	96.4	29	226	2
4th Inf Div (-)	13045	98.5	135	654	20
4th Inf Atch	833	87.6	10	43	
173d Abn Bde	5073	97.6	242	678	107
II Corps	1383	105.7	6	11	4
17th Avn	8034	89.9	9	48	11
CAP ROK	14161	102.3	108	174	
9th ROK	13918	105.4	95	118	1

(1) Includes HQ, I FFORCEV, Hq Company, I FFORCEV, 41st Engr Det (Terrain), 5th PI Det, 11th PI Det, (Press Camp), 13th Military History Det and 43d APU.

(2) Includes HQ IFFV Arty; 5 Bn, 27 Arty and 6th Bn, 32 Arty.

(3) Includes Hq Btry 52d Arty Gp; 3d Battalion 6th Arty; 6th Bn, 11th Arty; 1st Bn, 92d Arty; 5th Bn, 22 Arty; 77 FA Radar Det; and 237th FA Radar Det.

(4) Includes Hq Btry, 41st Arty Gp; 7th Bn, 13th Arty; 1st Bn, 30th Arty; 4th Bn, 60th Arty; Hqs 8th Bn, 26th Arty; Btry B, 29th Arty; A Btry, 3d Bn, 18th Arty; 7th Bn, 15th Arty and 241, 242, 243 and 244 Radar Dets.

(5) Includes 51st Sig Bn, 167th Sig Co and 209th Det.

ENLISTED PROMOTION ALLOCATIONS

	NOVEMBER					DECEMBER					JANUARY				
	E-9	E-8	E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-9	E-8	E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-9	E-8	E-7
HQ I FORGEV						5						2			
Hq Co I FORGEV					1	6						4			
5th PI Det						1						1			
11th PI Det												1			
13th PI Det												1			
41st CA Co												1			
43 AFU												1			
54th Sig Bn												1			
55th MI Det												1			
64th Engr Det												1			
272d MP Co												1			
297th Trans Co												1			
HQB I FORGEV Arty												1			
41st Arty Bp												1			
52d Arty Bp												1			
1st Bn 30th Arty												1			
1st Bn 92d Arty												1			
2d Bn 17th Arty												1			
3d Bn 6th Arty												1			
3d Bn 18th Arty												1			
4th Bn 60th Arty												1			
5th Bn 22d Arty												1			
6th Bn 27th Arty												1			
6th Bn 11th Arty												1			
6th Bn 32d Arty												1			
7th Bn 13th Arty												1			
7th Bn 15th Arty												1			
8th TAB 26th Arty												1			
TOTAL	2	25	49	213	235	47	259	332	1	3	59	241	509		

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NATIONAL STANDARD

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**REPORT RECEIVED**

	NOV	DEC	JAN
NO I FORCEV	39	44	48
NO CO I FORCEV	19	14	10
NO I FORCEV ARTT	14	17	17
NO SIG F3	79	62	73
NO CA CO	14	13	15
NO CO	16	17	20
NO CO	11	8	25
NO TR TRANS CO (CAR)	11	8	9
NO I ARTT	16	25	16
NO I ARTT	46	36	48
NO I 6TH ARTT	48	41	46
NO I 14TH ARTT	31	43	34
NO I 62 ARTT	26	27	19
NO I 62 ARTT	95	51	38
NO I 60TH ARTT	76	40	25
NO I 27TH ARTT	38	33	34
NO I 19TH ARTT	21	33	22
NO I 15TH ARTT	106	54	50
NO I 15TH ARTT	18	15	11
NO I 23TH ARTT	19	14	13
NO I 28TH ARTT	0	35	39
NO I 17TH ARTT	0	50	50
NO I 32D ARTT	52	47	0
NO I 4TH ARTT	52	40	0
NO I 40TH ARTT	45	79	0
NO I 14TH ARTT	81	49	0
NO I 94TH ARTT	49	49	0
TOTAL	983	902	603

97.9

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SA CES UTILIZED BY EACH SITE

	HAWAII	BACKLICK	AUSTRALIA	HONG KONG	TOKYO	PERANG	KUALA LUMPUR	MANILA	SINGAPORE	TAIPEI
1st I FORCE	19	32	19	14	9	5	1	7	5	5
2nd I FORCE	4	4	5	3	3	2	1	1	0	4
3rd I FORCE	9	9	17	21	4	2	1	2	1	3
4th SIG B	13	30	17	21	21	2	1	2	7	3
5th MI DET	6	3	4	3	3	2	1	1	2	3
27th MP CO	10	9	6	2	1	2	1	1	1	4
29th TRANS CO (CAR)	4	1	5	5	3	2	1	1	2	2
1st CA CO	12	8	5	3	3	1	2	1	2	1
2nd ARTY CO	9	5	3	3	3	2	1	1	2	1
3d EN 6th ARTY	37	20	14	12	9	6	3	2	3	5
6th EN 11th ARTY	29	32	12	14	9	6	3	2	3	11
1st EN 92d ARTY	8	23	6	15	11	6	6	4	6	10
1st ARTY OP	13(1)	9	5	6	4	1	2	1	3	11
2nd EN 30th ARTY	24(1)	24	10(1)	12	7	6	2	1	3	2(1)
7th EN 15th ARTY	15	28	14	24	31(2)	9	4	5	15	18
7th EN 13th ARTY	12	13	9	11	4(2)	2	4	3	2	5
5th EN 27th ARTY	21	13(1)	10	14	10	4	3	2	4	12
6th EN 32d ARTY	31	26	12	19(1)	13(1)	6	3	2	8	11(1)
8th TAB 26th ARTY	4	5	5	6	12	2	1	2	0	4
14th EN 60th ARTY	32	25	13	14	12	2	4	0	4	9(1)
B EN 29th ARTY	6	7	4	4	3	2	5	5	2	6
1st EN 10th ARTY	31	30	9	28	13	6	5	3	7	22
1st EN 10th ARTY	16	12(1)	9	15	13	6	1	3	5	10
2d EN 9th ARTY	15	14	8	14	11	6	4	3	5	9
6th EN 14th ARTY	22	15	8	17(1)	12	7	3	3	6	12(1)
TOTAL	503(2)	399(2)	212(1)	290(2)	226(3)	103	62	78	98	189(4)

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# MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES BY UNIT

For 2d Qtr FY 68

1a	NO. OF INJURIES		INJURY 1b COST	UNIT	1c INJURY CASES PER 100,000 MAN DAYS
	FATAL	NON FATAL			
0	0		\$ 0	5th PI Det	0.00
0	0		0	11th PI Det	0.00
0	0		0	43d APU	0.00
0	0		0	64th Engr Det	0.00
0	0		0	HHC, I FFORCEV	0.00
0	0		0	55th MI Det	0.00
0	0		0	272d MP Co	0.00
0	0		0	297th Trans Co	0.00
0	0		0	41st CA Co	0.00
0	0		0	HHC, I FFV Arty	0.00
0	0		0	HHC, 41st Cp	0.00
0	0		0	3/26 Arty	0.00
0	0		0	B/29 Arty	0.00
0	0		0	HHC, 52d Gp	0.00
0	0		0	6/14 Arty	0.00
0	1		4,284	54th Sig Bn	1.23
0	2		8,568	4/60 Arty	3.26
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX			EXPECTANCY CEILING	XXXXXXXXXXXXX	4.50 XXXXX
0	2		8,568	3/6 Arty	4.81
0	2		8,568	2/17 Arty	4.99
0	2		8,568	5/27 Arty	5.21
0	3		12,568	1/30 Arty	5.52
2	1		88,284	1/92 Arty	5.83
0	3		12,852	6/32 Arty	6.23
0	3		12,852	7/15 Arty	6.25
0	4		17,136	7/13 Arty	8.24
2	23		\$182,532	I FFORCEV TOTAL	3.57

1a Includes all injuries resulting in death, permanent impairment or disability necessitating hospitalization beyond midnight of the day following accident.

1b Based on empirical data contained in DA Cir 385-16. Fatality: \$42,000 Non-Fatal: \$4,284.

1c Reflects disabling injury rate as compared with established expectancy rate ceiling.

NOTE: Above data is a compilation of the accident reports and exposure data as reported to this headquarters by the units shown.

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## ARMY MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS BY UNIT

For 2d Qtr FY 68

a No. Acc	MIL INJ		VN INJ b		DAMAGE COST \$	UNIT	No. Accidents <sup>c</sup> per 100,000 miles driven
	Fatal	Non Fatal	Fatal	Non Fatal			
0	0	0	0	0	0	HHC, I FFORGEV	0.00
0	0	0	0	0	0	5th PI Det	0.00
0	0	0	0	0	0	11th PI Det	0.00
0	0	0	0	0	0	43d APU	0.00
0	0	0	0	0	0	61st Eng. Det	0.00
0	0	0	0	0	0	55th MI Det	0.00
0	0	0	0	0	0	272d MP Co	0.00
0	0	0	0	0	0	297th Trans Co	0.00
0	0	0	0	0	0	11st CA Co	0.00
0	0	0	0	0	0	HHC, IFFV, Arty	0.00
0	0	0	0	0	0	4-60 Arty	0.00
0	0	0	0	0	0	8-26 Arty	0.00
0	0	0	0	0	0	8-29 Arty	0.00
0	0	0	0	0	0	2-17 Arty	0.00
0	0	0	0	0	0	3-6 Arty	0.00
1	0	0	0	1	80	5-27 Arty	.58
1	0	0	0	1	0	7-13 Arty	.58
3	0	0	1	1	250	6-32 Arty	.66
1	0	0	0	0	500	6-14 Arty	.82
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX					EXPECTANCY CEILING	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	1.00 XXXX
1	0	0	1	0	0	1-30 Arty	1.33
1	0	0	0	0	50	HHC, 11st Gp	1.70
1	0	0	0	0	1,565	HHC, 52d Gp	2.01
5	0	0	0	1	3,848	51st Sig Bn	2.06
4	1	0	1	0	3,217	1-92 Arty	2.37
6	0	1	0	3	3,845	7-15 Arty	2.52
24	1	1	3	7	\$13,355	I FFORGEV TOTAL	.93

a Reported Army vehicle accidents resulting in disabling injury or \$50,000 (+) damage cost.

b Total RVN nationals killed or injured in all Army vehicle involved accidents.

c Army vehicle accident rate as compared with established expectancy rate ceiling.

NOTE: Above data is a compilation of the accident reports and exposure data as reported to this headquarters by the units shown.

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